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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A recent emphasis in the research areas of beliefs, attitudes, 
and public opinion has been the examination of various structural 
characteristics of the cognitive systems in which such evaluative 
phenomena are organized. The importance of such structural 
characteristics is assumed to derive from the possibility that 
cognitive organization at least partially determines regularity and 
predictability in behavior, and conversely, that changes in attitudes 
occur within the context and limitations of the prevailing attitude 
structure. 
The term constraint has been used to identify one of the 
structural properties of attitude systems. Specifically, constraint 
refers to the magnitude of interrelationship existing among individual 
attitude elements within a cognitive system; that is, the degree to 
which specific attitude·evaluations are linked together into a 
meaningful whole. 
The constraint variable is of interest to the social scientist 
for basically two reasons. First, it makes possible an analysis 
of attitude systems and processes which is more dynamic in nature 
than conventional content oriented investigations. An understanding 
of the manner in which specific attitudes are linked together would, 
furthermore, contribute to existing theories concerning the origin, 
l 
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development, and change of specific attitudes. Secondly, and perhaps 
more important, is the fact that constraint has been found to be 
related to other cognitive and behavioral phenomena of considerable 
political and social relevance. Thus, the general purpose of the 
present investigation was to examine the nature of constraint as it 
relates to a variety of variables presumed to have political and social 
implications. The level of constraint has been found to vary as a 
function of the amount of information available to support a system 
of social attitudes. Therefore, the interaction between information 
and constraint and their respective influences on political phenomena 
such as voting, party identification, political participation, etc. 
were considered. 
Attitude Organization and Change 
By far the phenomena most extensively investigated by social 
psychologists has been the development, content, and change of social 
and political attitudes. Although a variety of definitions of this 
concept have been proposed, the term attitude is generally taken to 
denote a psychological predisposition to respond favorably or 
unfavorably to the object of the attitude (e.g. see Fishbein, 1967; 
Insko, 1967). Attitude referents or objects can include a variety 
of entities such as people, ideas, events, etc. Of special concern 
to attitude theorists is the manner in which attitudes are changed 
and the way in which they are organized into systems of beliefs. Many 
contemporary statements of attitude change and organization express 
the assumption that individuals strive toward a maintenance of 
consistency among the various cognitive elements relevant to attitudes 
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(Abelson, et. al., 1968). The unifying characteristic among what 
might be called the balance theories is the idea that cognitive 
imbalance, inconsistency, dissonance, etc. are psychologically 
disturbing states which provide motivation to change attitude elements 
in the direction of consistency (e.g. Heider, 1946; Newcomb, 1953; 
Festinger, 1957; Osgood and Tannenbaum, 1955; and Abelson and 
Rosenberg, 1958). Thus, it is implied that the tendency toward such 
homeostatic balance is a universal principle of cognitive organization 
which explains both the organization.of and change within systems 
of attitudes. These theories, however, have been generated primarily 
from experiments of rather simplified, experimentally induced 
attitudes and have rarely examined actual positions on complex 
social and political issues. 
By contrast, non-experimental studies of attitude systems have 
produced little support for the consistency formulations. For 
example, Kerr (1953) compared several domains of liberalism-
conservatism (e.g. religious, political, economic, etc.) and reported 
an average correlation of only .15. Olsen (1962) found that only 
approximately 1/4 of the subjects investigated could be classified 
as evidencing attitude crystallization (consistency) as determined 
by a Guttman scaling procedure. Similarily, Robin and Story (1964) 
in a study of ideological consistency reported coefficients ranging 
from .05 to .70 for various groups of subjects and only a moderate 
correlation of .43 for the total sample. Moreover, a few experimental 
studies have been recently reported which indicate that the tendency 
to resolve attitude inconsistencies or dissonance may be related to 
various individual differences in personality and cognitive structure 
(e.g. Harvey and Ware, 1967; Epstein, 1969; Stenitz, 1969; and 
Steiner and Rogers, 1963). In other words, there is some evidence 
to suggest that notions of cognitive balance have been unduly 
emphasized and that other factors mediate the tendency of subjects 
to resolve attitude inconsistencies. It seems reasonable to assume 
that one such mediating factor might be the overall coherence and 
structure characteristic of an.individual's attitudes as indicated 
by levels of constraint. 
Attitude System Constraint 
4 
In the present study, the term constraint is used to refer to 
the dimension of interrelatedness existing among individual attitudes 
or idea elements in a system of social attitudes. Interrelatedness 
implies that a functional relationship exists among attitudes which 
link the content, strength, stability, and salience of each 
individual evaluation with others in the.system. A system of 
attitudes is simply the-combination of several evaluations all 
pertaining to the same object of evaluation or referent domain. Thus, 
for example, the higher the level of constraint among the political 
beliefs of a given individual the more·closely that individual's 
· opinions approximate a coherent ideology or belief system in that 
what an individual holds to be true or correct in one sphere of 
political activity would be related to their evaluations of 
other aspects of politics. The person who is said to subscribe 
to a conservative political ideology is expected to behave 
conservatively in response to, for example, issues of foreign 
trade as well as issues involving other foreign and domestic 
policies. 1 By contrast, low levels of constraint would be found 
in individuals who manifest inconsistent and unpredictable responses 
to a given set of attitudinal stimuli. Presumably the behavior of 
such individuals would be better eJCplained by the temporary salience 
· of environmental factors than by conventional attitude system 
concepts which assume the exist.enc~ of relatively stable dispositional 
chara~teristics. Low constraint individuals (i. e, non~ideologue) 
might be conservative on some issues and liberal on others. 
Moreover, they would be more likely to respond to political stimuli 
in a ~ompartmentalized and fragmented manner. Such individuals 
often endorse what appear to be logical absurdities with considerable 
fervor, e.g. favoring a reduction of federal taxes and, at the same 
5 
time, an expansion of social welfare services. '11ie above descriptions, 
of course, are intended to represent theoretical extremes of the 
constraint factor. One would expect that constraint would vary 
along some continuum in actual subject populations. 
Constraint then refers to the commonly perceived tendency of 
some individuals to evidence ideological consistency while others 
are illogical and confused about politics. Also, implicit in this 
definition is the notion that constraint derives from a set of 
abstract generalizations which do not refer directly to attitude 
1nie concepts of liberalism and conservatism are used to denote 
divergent attitude systems concerning the nature of political, 
economic, and social order. Liberalism refers to attitudes which 
favor or emphasize change, social experimentation, rationality, and 
the essential goodness of human nature, while conservatism is defined 
as endorsement of the status quo, tradition, religion, orderliness, 
etc. (see e.g. Mcclosky, 1958; Key~ 1961; Wilson, 1973). Although 
widely used in the literature these concepts probably have particular 
relevance and applicability only when the level of constraint is 
relatively high. 
\ 
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objects. Instead, the ideological person adheres to a set of 
assumptions concerning broad political categories and these assumptions 
are brought to bear in the interpretation of concrete events and 
entities. Therefore, constraint implies more than superficial 
consistency between attitude elements (although operational definitions 
and hence statistical indexes of constraint are often limited to this 
restriction). Constraint also includes the notion of structural 
cohesion based on logical derivations from basic principles. 
The concept of constraint occupies a central position in theories 
of political behavior, especially at the sociological and political 
science levels of analysis. Despite its importance, the number of 
empirical studies of constraint is relatively meager. The most 
extensive exposition of the concept has been presented by the Survey 
Research Center group (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960) 
and,•i.n particular, by Converse (1964). Converse presents a dynamic 
definition in which constraint is seen as: 
the probability that a change in the perceived status 
(truth, desirability, and so forth) of one idea-
element would require from the point of view of the 
actor, some compensating change(s) in the status 
of idea-elements elsewhere in the configuration 
(p. 208). 
Converse hypothesizes several sources or causal factors which 
determine constraint such as personal dispositions to be objective and 
logical in the classical sense; a desire to adhere to some universal 
first principle; as well as more socially based motivations 
including the tendency of persons occupying similar·niches in a 
social order to develop similar explanatory principles for beliefs 
because of the congruity between their life styles and social positions. 
Crucial to the definition.of constraint proposed by Converse is the 
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concept that constraint also derives from the natural social processes 
by which ideologies are created and dispersed throughout a social 
system. It is argued that belief systems are created by that small 
segment of a social population which by virture of its education, 
interest, opportunity and intelligence generate the connecting 
assumptions which, in turn, create constraint. Such "packaged 
ideologies," as Converse refers to them, are then diffused among the 
general public which comes to believe in the appropriateness and 
naturalness of these assumptions without experiencing the initial 
process of analyzing, synthesizing, and imposing logical organization 
on the idea-elements or attitudes involved. One implication of 
this source of constraint is that .social or ideological consensus 
emerges since the "masses" of society learn and adopt a prefabricated 
ideological framework through which to evaluate political events. 
Thus at the societal level there exists at least some semblance of 
agreement as to the meanings and implications of various political 
events, terminologies, philosophies, etc. As Converse notes: 
- Any set of relatively intelligent consumers, i.e., 
· the mass public who are initially sympathetic to the 
crowning posture turns out to show more consensus 
on specific implications of the posture as a result 
of social diffusion of 'what goes with what' than 
it would if each member were required to work out 
the implications individually without socially 
provided cues. (p. 212) 
Despite such tendencies favoring consensus, Converse concludes 
that true ideological positions (i.e. highly constrained belief 
systems) are almost exclusively a phenomenon evidenced by political 
elites, e.g. politicians, political observers, etc. Thus, while 
some.degree of constraint would be expected to characterize the 
political beliefs of the general public, high levels of constraint are 
typical only of a politically active and aware minority. 
More specifically, Converse argued that constraint varies as a 
linear function of political sophistication. Sophistication basically 
refers to knowledge about politics, but the concept, as employed by 
Converse, also includes the ability to correctly articulate the 
abstract terminology used to describe political sentiments and 
orientations (e.g. liberalism and conservatism). Hence a continuum 
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of political knowledge was hypothesized with the higher levels of 
information being associated with highly constrained ideologies and 
decreasing levels of knowledge implying less integration among beliefs. 
Converse further suggested that since the level of sophistication 
would be substantial only for a minority of the general public, then 
the degree of interrelatedness among the attitude systems of the 
vast majority of individuals would be expected to be only slight. 
In order to test these assumptions a stratified, random sample 
of adult registered voters was interviewed. Subjects were asked to 
respond to a series of open-ended questions concerning an upcoming 
presidential election (e.g. What do you like or dislike about the candi-
dates, political parties, platforms, etc.?), Responses were classified 
according to several criteria including the amount of information, 
amount of issues content and the appropriateness of the political 
terminology used to answer the questions. 
The results appeared to support Converse's contentions in that 
·only a scant minority (2 1/2%) of the subjects were judged to have 
evidenced the degree of information and sophistication thought to be 
associated with constrained ideologies. A second group (near-ideologues) 
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of subjects which comprised 9% of the sample were judged to have 
manifested a degree of knowledge and sophistication similar to the 
ideological subjects. However, the remaining subjects were character-
ized as possessing only minimal or vague knowledge of political affairs, 
in that they used political terms incorrectly or inconsistently. 
Moreover, a substantial portion of these remaining subjects (22 1/2% 
of the total sample) were judged as having no interest in nor awareness 
of politics! Converse also reported that objective measures tapping 
the degree of political information, taken independently, confirmed 
the validity of the subjective ratings. 
To further support the contention that constraint varies as a 
linear function of information or sophistication, Converse reported 
data obtained from a group of political candidates (elite group) and 
a random sample of adults (masses group). Constraint was defined as 
the magnitude of tau-gamma (i.e. a measure of association in ordered 
classes; e. g. see Hays, 1963) coefficients between responses to 
questions concerning eight foreign and domestic policy issues (e.g. 
aid to education, federal housing, military aid to foreign countries, 
etc.). The coefficients for the elite group ranged from .05 to .68 
with averages of .53 within domestic issues, .37 within foreign issues, 
and .25 between domestic and foreign issues, while the masses group 
yielded a range of - . 04 to .45 and averages of • 23, . 23, and .11 
respectively. As a result, Converse concluded that the level of 
constraint existing among the beliefs of most people is rather low 
and that it decreases with decreasing levels of political knowledge. 
Although Converse's seminal work has served its heuristic 
purpose, in the view of the present author, its conclusions have been 
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widely accepted without sufficient examination. For example, many of 
his conclusions rest solely on a theoretical discussion wherein data 
is ineidentally brought to bear cm substantive .. contentions; as 
·, 
opposed to a more direct, empirical investigation of these phenomena. 
For example, Converse's claim that constraint varies as a linear 
function of political sophistication in part derives from the elites 
vs. masses data cited above. Since only two levels of sophistication 
were involved a linear relationship was thereby imposed on the data. 
It is therefore conceivable that the relationship between political 
knowledge and constraint may be more complex than Converse has 
suggested. Also, much of Converse's work has involved assessing 
information and constraint simultaneously by scoring the responses 
to open-ended questions. Thus, it is also possible that he has 
confounded the effects ofinformation and constraint and that again 
more objective and direct procedures would yield different results. 
The studies investigating constraint have reported mixed findings 
relative to the model proposed by Converse. For example, Brown (1970) 
used a Q-sort technique to estimate the level of constraint for 
articulate (elites) and inarticulate (masses) subjects. With·repeated 
measures over time he found that the belief structures of inarticulate 
subjects persisted, as did those of articulate subjects. Brown 
concluded that some constrained belief systems may be based on 
"populist" ideology with less emphasis on information and political 
sophistication. 
Luttbeg (1968) also found little support for Converse's contention 
that the belief systems of leaders and followers would differ 
significantly. Using items tapping specific political issues Luttbeg 
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reported the intercorrelational matrices derived from factor analytic 
procedures as an index of constraint. He found that the estimates of 
commonality of five factors explained 74% of the variance for leaders 
and 65% for the citizens group. Luttbeg concluded that such a 
difference is not as substantial as would be expected from Converse's 
hypothesis. Moreover, within the citizens group itself, he found 
that the five factors which emerged accounted for 69% of the variance 
for those most politically involved, 65% for those intermediately 
involved, and 67% for those least involved in politics. Thus a 
linear relationship between political sophistication and constraint 
was not observed. Using procedures similar to those of Converse and 
data from the same source (i.e. Survey Research Center interview 
protocals) Field and Anderson (1969) found that modest but· 
significant changes in the percentage of voters manifesting constrained 
,,; 
ideological evaluations occurred from one election year to the next. 
They concluded that constraint is therefore at least partially determined 
by transitory political stimuli (e.g. the ideological distance between 
presidential candidates) rather than exclusively a dimension of 
individual personality. 
Axelrod (1967) used cluster analysis to examine the structure of 
public opinion on policy issues and reported that no well defined 
ideology exists among the general public except for very weak traces 
of populism and liberalism-conservatism. However, supporting Converse, 
Axelrod did find that groups who were more politically sophisticated 
(e.g. political participants, the wealthy, college graduates, indi-
viduals who were politically concerned, and informed subjects) 
manifested somewhat greater coherence than did less sophisticated 
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groups (e.g. the total population, the poor, the uneducated, and 
non-voters). 
Supporting Converse, Bowles and Richardson (1969) reported that 
the tendency toward constrained ideologies varied as a function of 
interest in politics (as determined by combining estimates of political 
information level and political participation) and the ability to use 
abstract concepts. However, these observers concluded that constraint 
and opinion consistency were not synonymous, arguing instead that 
ideological conceptualization precedes attitude consistency. 
i< Similarly, Kessel (1965) reported that estimates of logical 
consistency and political information showed a significant rank order 
correlation coefficient of .62. The relationships between constraint 
and several other variables were also significant; for example, a 
correlation of .55 was found between constraintcand differentiation 
(i.e. the number of arguments used to support a belief), while a 
coefficient of .56 indicated the association between constraint and 
time span (i.e. use of historical and future perspectives to defend 
beliefs). 
Several additional studies at a broader level of analysis may 
also be interpreted as confirmation of Converse's theory. For 
example, it has been found that ideological consensus (i.e. agreement 
on democratic norms among the adult electorate) is a characteristic 
~o'ij:n,d only among the more sophisticated and politically active 
minority (Mcclosky, 1961; Key, 1961). Similarly, studies examining 
the flow of information among mass publics have emphasized the role 
of certain strategic individuals in the dissemination of information 
and opinion (e.g. Katz, 1957; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1948). 
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These key individuals or opinion leaders are similar to Converse's high 
constraint subjects in that they are better informed, more active, and 
possess greater personal power and influence in the determination of 
public opinion. Thus, several sources of data support Converse's 
contention that ideological consistency is rare and that most people 
are best characterized as inconsistent, unsystematic, and chaotic in 
their evaluation of and participation·in political affairs. 
While most theorists see this distinction as deriving from the 
interplay of personal and social phenomena, e.g. amount of information, 
social cross-pressures, etc., it is also possible to conclude that 
ideological inconsistency is universal and derives from the lack of 
order in the political system itself. Such an iconoclastic view, 
however, would fail to account for the examples of consistency that are 
observed regardless of their rarity, and the often replicated finding, 
discussed above, that consistency and indexes of political knowledge, 
involvement, sophistication, etc. are closely related. All observers 
agree that as a person becomes more involved in and familiar with 
politics the degree of consistency increases. Thus, inconsistency 
is most closely associated with·a relative lack of understanding or 
knowledge and under such restrictions it would not be surprising 
to find that political events appear to be chaotic and confusing. 
In the view of the present author, the issue is not so much a question 
of whether or not political knowledge and sophistication leads to 
consistency, but whether ideological consistency is possible under any 
other set of circumstances. As indicated above, some studies have 
been reported which suggest that a "populist" form of constraint is 
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often manifested in non-elite groups (e.g. Brown, 1970). There remains 
also unresolved questions such as the effects of constraint or consis-
tency on related phenomena, e.g. attitude change. 
Previous research by the present author (Jones and Rambo, 1973) 
has concentrated on the relationship between the level of constraint 
in the liberalism-conservatism domain and the amount of political 
information available to support this system of attitudes. Average 
interitem contingency coefficients between responses to the Social 
Attitude Scale (SAS, Rambo, 1972) were employed as the index of 
constraint. Results differing from Converse's model were reported 
in that subjects who scored both high and low on the political 
information scale yielded significantly higher levels of constraint 
than did subjects with intermediate levels of information. These 
results were interpreted as suggesting that the impact of incoming 
information on attitude structure varies with the existing level of 
information and the degree of constraint present in the system of 
attitudes. For example, individuals with high constraint but little 
information to support the unique-configuration of their attitude 
relationships may endure a breakdown of attitude structure if new 
information contradictory to their attitudes is assimilated. By 
contrast, persons characterized by higher levels of information and 
high·constraint can more easily accept new and possibly dissonant 
information in that sufficient knowledge is available to balance or 
explain apparent contradictions. These two groups were designated 
intuitive and cognizant respectively, because both styles of belief 
represent highly organized and structured attitude systems, but one 
apparently results from information seeking behavior while the other 
is information avoidant. 
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Subjects in this study with intermediate scores on the information 
test yielded an index of constraint which was significantly lower 
than that of the above two groups. It was suggested that these 
subjects had acquired sufficient political information to disrupt 
and challenge the intuitive style of belief but not enough to provide 
for a reorganization of attitudes in a manner typified by the cognizant 
group. 
Thus, a new model depicting the relationship between information 
and constraint was proposed in which constraint varies as a nonlinear 
function of information. It was further hypothesized that this 
relationship represents a developmental sequence in which individuals 
shift from the uncritical and intuitive attitude systems of adolescence 
which are learned by modeling socialization agents and authority 
figures to a transitional period of disorganization, confusion, and 
unpredictability, followed by an intellectual reorganization of 
attitudes supported by information relevant to the system. It is 
interesting to note that the majority of subjects were classified as 
belonging to the transitional group, i.e. low constraint. This 
suggests that while a developmental process may be operating it is by 
no means the only factor effecting the logical coherence of the 
respondents' belief systems. The developmental interpretation was, 
however, supported by the fact that political orientation, as measured 
by the SAS, changed from more conservative to less conservative to 
more liberal in conjunction with the information continuum, that is, 
the intuitive group on the average responded in a conservative 
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direction to the attitude scale, the transitional group yielded moderate 
attitudes, while the cognizant group showed more liberal orientations. 
Related research by Rambo, Jones, and Finney (1973) elaborated 
on the development interpretation by suggesting that attitude change 
might be better characterized as a reorganization within the attitude 
system than the conventional concept of movement along a unidimensional 
scale. These researchers reported data tentatively supporting this 
hypothesis in that subjects who reported recent shifts in attitudes 
manifested higher levels of constraint than did subjects not reporting 
recent changes in their attitudes. 
Political Information 
Research concerning political information has centered primarily 
on the amount, content, and manner in which information is disseminated 
in mass publics. The overwhelming conclusion offered by researchers 
in this area is that most individuals possess a paucity of political 
knowledge. Data reported by Greenstein (1963) serves as an example. 
A large cross-section sample of adult American subjects were able to 
respond correctly to the following questions in the following proportions: 
number of U.S. Senators from each state (55%); the length of a U.S. 
Representative's term of office (47%); the number of U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices (40%); and one provision of the Bill of Rights (23%). 
Since such fundamental knowledge as the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights is lacking in over three quarters of the population, it wonld 
be expected that little of the constant flow of political information 
contained in daily newspapers and news broadcasts would be retained 
by the majority of adults, which is not to mention the more complex 
and esoteric aspects of political knowledge as exemplified by news 
analysis and editorial opinion. In his discussion of information 
about world affairs, Robinson (1967) cites a dozen studies confirming 
this contention. In addition, from a review of such studies he 
estimates that 80% of the adult American public apparently see no 
connection between their personal affairs and political events at 
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the national and international level as reflected by surveys of public 
information about politics. 
Studies assessing the impact of educational campaigns directed 
toward the mass public yield similar results. For example, an attempt 
to acquaint residents of a large metropolitan area with the United 
Nations produced only negligible gains in public awareness (Star and 
Hughes, 1950). 
Despite the general lack of knowledge, political information has 
been found to cluster in some respondents, i.e. if a person knows 
several of the correct answers to a survey information quiz the 
probability that all the answers are known exceeds chance. Thus, 
political information seeking behavior is cumulative as it is the 
better informed among the electorate who expose themselves more to 
sources of political information (Milbrath, 1971). 
A number of sociological and demographic variables also relate to 
observed levels of political information. For example, Robinson 
(1967) reports that greater amounts of knowledge are associated with 
the first of each of the following group comparisons: whites vs. 
blacks; males vs. females; older vs. younger; residence in cities vs. 
residence in smaller communities; higher income vs. lower income; more 
education vs. less education; professional occupations vs. skilled or 
"blue collar" employment. 
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Political Effects of Information and Constraint 
Several studies (e.g. Campbell, et. al., 1964) suggest that the 
principal behavioral result of political sophistication (e.g. knowledge 
as well as ideological conceptualization) is active involvement in 
political affairs, e.g. registration, voting, campaigning, etc. 
Similarly, Campbell and his associates (1954) have found that interest 
in politics, perceived importance of politics and partisanship, all 
vary as a function of political sophistication. As previously noted, 
however, a possible difficulty arises when information and constraint 
are assessed simultaneously, in that it is possible that these two 
factors differentially effect the rates of various forms of political 
involvement. When political information is determined independently 
there is a strong relationship between knowledge and political 
participation (Milbrath, 1971). However, research to date has failed 
to examine the effects of constraint on participation directly, or 
the effects of information and constraint separately. One exception 
is the study by Rambo, Jones, and Finney (1973) which suggested that 
variables indicating active political involvement such as registering 
to vote and campaigning were associated with higher constraint, while 
indexes of affiliation (e.g. political party preference) failed to 
significantly discriminate between levels of constraint. Thus, while 
there is a general assumption that political knowledge and constraint 
among attitude elements leads to political involvement, this contention 
has been inadequately researched. 
Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of the present investigation was to evaluate the 
theoretical status of attitude system constraint and political 
information. This was achieved by pursuing four research objectives .. 
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' First', the literature examining the effects of constraint has suffered 
from a lack of reliable and economical measurement techniques. A 
wide variety of _methods have been used all of which limit the 
researcher in one fashion or another. For example, the subjective 
interview technique employed by Converse (1964) is costly and time 
consuming. In addition, despite the guidance provided by scoring 
criteria, there is always the danger that results derived from the 
subjective judging of interview protocols will be influenced by 
extraneous factors. It is possible, for example, that intelligence 
or some other dimension of individual differences between subjects 
could have figured in the assessment of political sophistication 
although not directly related to it. On the other hand, the 
calculation of interitem contingency coefficients (Jones and Rambo, 
1973) is also complex and time consuming as it ordinarily would 
involve computerization of the data. This method is further limited 
by the fact that estimates of constraint are made for groups of 
subjects rather than individuals and thus it is difficult to use 
constraint as an independent variable, thereby restricting the 
number of studies examining constraint in this fashion. Other 
methods cited in the literat,ure have similar deficiencies. Moreover, 
the fact that constraint has been assessed in a different manner by 
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each researcher suggests the possibility that at least some of the 
theoretical differences and contradictory results have been determined 
by differences in measurement techniques. 
Therefore, one possible contribution of the present study is the 
development of a constraint measure which can be individually 
determined, which avoids the shortcomings of previous methods, and 
which is validated to the point that there exists some possibility 
that other researchers will adopt, or at least consider its use. The 
initial phases of the development of such a scale were accomplished 
as part of this investigation and are described in the next chapter. 
A second research objective concerns constraint and information 
as they relate to the phenomena of attitude change. No research has 
been conducted examining the possibility that the overall coherence 
and structure of a person's attitudes mediate attitude change in 
response to experimental manipulations. Similarily, no references 
to the effects of information on attitude change could be found in 
the literature. As a result an experiment was performed in which 
constraint and information served as independent variables. Subjects 
were asked to indicate their approval of several social issues as 
well as their attitude toward President Nixon. In a later experimental 
session, the subjects were confronted with observed inconsistencies 
in these responses, asked to explain, and then given the opportunity 
to evaluate Nixon and the issues a second time. Changes in the 
degree of 'inconsistency between the evaluations of Nixon and the 
social issues were calculated as the index of attitude change. This 
manipulation was selected because of evidence which suggests that 
being confronted with inconsistent values or beliefs stimulates 
especially powerful motivations to change such values or beliefs 
(Rokeach, 1968). 
The experiment was designed to test a central theoretical 
implication of constraint. Important to the concept is the notion 
that a constrained ideology involves an interrelated cognitive 
network in which the status of one attitude is effected by change 
in another attitude. Thus the constrained ideology would be expected 
to be resistant to change because individual attitudes are linked 
to, and hence bolstered by, the rest of the system. Moreover, what 
might qualify as an inconsistent pair of attitudes by experimental 
definition may nonetheless be an integral part of a constrained set 
of beliefs; that is, even the apparently inconsistent attitudes of 
the highly constrained person are more likely to be derivations from 
some set of presuppositions which structures the entire system. As 
was noted earlier, the concept of constraint implies more than 
internal consistency and therefore the anchoring and connecting 
properties of constraint should "protect" individual attitudes from 
external influence and attack. 
By contrast, the subjects who possess little or no structural 
cohesion among separate attitudes would be expected to be more 
vulnerable to the experimental manipulation. This expectation does 
not derive from any suggestion that the low constraint subject has 
a dispositional need to amend attitudes in the direction of 
homeostatic consistency, nor is it implied that such subjects will 
be more easily changed because their attitudes are only marginally 
supported in the sense of ego-involvement (although this latter 
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condition may be·at least partially true). Instead, the low constraint 
subject lacks the interconnections and ideological perspective to 
resist change. Since the belief systems in these subjects consist 
of compartmentalized, fragmented, and loosely connected conglomerations 
of ideas and evaluations, change would be easier, and hence preferable 
than resistance to the experimenter. It should be recognized that the 
experimenter's question ''What explains this contradiction?" contains 
a subtle, yet compelling implicit suggestion to the effect that the 
subject should rearrange or alter his evaluations on these issues, 
i..e. make them· cons is tent. 
In the view of the present author, the notion that higher levels 
of constraint lead to resistance to attitude change and lower levels 
are associated with persuasibility derives directly from theoretical 
statements of constraint and represents the most probable outcome 
of the experiment. 
On the other hand, it might be argued that, in this particular 
experiment, high·constraint subjects would be more likely to change 
their attitudes. It follows that persons who evidence more logical 
and consistent ideologies would be especially motivated to resolve 
inconsistencies made salient by the experimenter. The use of 
attitude inconsistencies therefore provided an especially powerful 
test of the concept in that, all other things being equal, one might 
indeed expect the constrained person to be motivated to remove or 
balance inconsistent attitudes. Thus, the·experiment provided a 
test of two theoretical assumptions pertaining to constraint which in 
this instance are contradictory. 
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Similarily, well informed subjects should manifest greater 
resistance to attempted attitude manipulation because of the avail-
ability of resources to counteract the confrontation. Political 
knowledge could be used to rationalize or explain away the 
inconsistency as well as perhaps reinforce a certain kind of assurance 
that would be expected to occur when one is knowledgeable in a certain area 
of disco.:urse. It is also probable that the very possession of 
information implies that a person has considered, discussed, etc. 
these issues before and thus perhaps even the inconsistency itself. 
As a result, the informed subject is less susceptible to manipulation 
in that a practiced "routine" of arguments in defense of attitudes 
and their relationships to one another is available. Furthermore, 
as information decreases vulnerability to attitude change should 
increase as lower information subjects would possess fewer resources 
for resisting the confrontation. The fact that the experiment 
includes a face-to-face confrontation should minimize the extent 
to which lower information subjects (and low constraint subjects) 
exercise their normative procedure for resis.:ting persuasion, i.e. 
avoidance of dissonant communications. 
Given the above-considerations, the following hypotheses were 
proposed: 
1. Attitude change will vary as an inverse function 
of the level of constraint. 
2. Attitude change will vary as an inverse function 
of the level of information. 
Although no precisely worded theoretical statement was made to 
this-effect, the-experimental procedure was designed with the general 
expectation that systematic individual differences in susceptibility 
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to the attitude manipulation would occur. This is mentioned because 
the basic thrust of the balanc.e theories br,efly discussed above would 
seem to suggest that the tendency toward the maintenance of attitude 
consistency is a first principle of cognitive motivation and thus 
inconsistencies are resolved whenever they occur. By contrast, this 
experiment sought to demonstrate that dispositional characteristics 
of subjects mediate the tendency to seek balance even when incon-
sistencies are made the focus of interpersonal interactions. 
Finally, several aspects of subject behavior during the 
confrontation interview itself were monitored, but these variables 
were considered ancillary to the major concern of attitude change 
and therefore specific hypotheses were not generated. Also, these 
interview content variables were measured subjectively, without the 
benefit of validational or reliability procedures. Thus, they were 
included as more or less a subjective check on the ''operating 
characteristics" of the instruments used to classify subjects and 
to gain an intuitive "feel" for the hypothesized relationships. 
The third objective concerned political correlates of information 
and constraint. In both studies several indexes of political behavior 
and decision making were assessed in relation to information and 
constraint levels. Extrapolating from the available data and the 
theoretical definition of constraint the following relationships 
are-expected: 
1. Political participation will vary as a direct 
function of information and constraint (i.e. 
higher levels of these variables will be 
associated with greater participation, and so 
on). 
2. The perceived importance of voting will vary as 
a direct function of information and constraint. 
3. The tendency to vote a straight as opposed to a 
split ticket will be greater for higher levels of 
information and constraint. 
4. Voting decisions will be earlier for higher· levels 
of information and constraint. 
· 5. Rates of voter· registration and voting will vary 
directly as a function of information and constraint. 
6. The tendency to use·formal as opposed to informal 
(e.g. friends) sources for political news and 
opinion will be greater for higher levels of 
information.and constraint. 
7. Political party identification will vary as a 
function of information but not constraint. 
8. Males will yield significantly higher constraint 
and information scores than females. 
9. The perceived degree of recent attitude change 
will vary directly as a function of constraint 
and information. 
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Although of secondary importance to the present investigation, data 
conc~rning these·hypothesized relationships will aid in completing a 
conceptual model of ideological types in relation to combinations 
of information and constraint. Hypotheses one through five represent 
restatements of the observed relationships between constraint and these 
variables reported by Campbell, et. al. (1964). In addition to the 
ever present need for replication, these hypotheses extend the 
investigation of Campbell and his associates by including corresponding 
expectations for constraint. As indicated, previous research in this 
area has failed to examine the effects of information and constraint 
separately, that is, the two variables are either confounded or 
information.is omitted entirely. Although there are strong suggestions 
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in the literature that both information and constraint lead to similar 
manifestations of political involvement these assertions have not 
been tested directly. 
Similarly, hypothesis six was derived from an empirical base. 
The relationship between political information and media usage has 
been well established (e.g. Robinson, 1967) but no studies could be 
found relating this variable to constraint. 
The remaining three hypotheses were generated from the study 
reported by Rambo, Jones, and Finney (1973). Their importance 
stems from the need to clarify the manner in which constraint and 
information interact with other personal characteristics (i.e. sex 
and party affiliation) related to political behavior. In addition, 
these researchers discovered a curious and provocative relationship 
between the·report of recent attitude change and the level of 
constraint. Thus, hypothesis nine suggests that persons characterized 
by constrained and informed political beliefs will perceive greater 
attitude reorganiza\tion than lower information and constraint indi-
viduals. This expectation derives from the fact that the former 
group possesses an internal "yardstick" (i.e. a constrained ideology) 
by which to measure (i.e. perceive, be aware of, etc.) changes in 
political attitudes. It is not suggested that such individuals do 
in fact experience more change. Instead, it is probable that low 
constraint and information subjects lack the cognitive structure 
and organization which would render attitude·changes meaningful. 
The study also included a preliminary investigation of personality 
differences associated with levels of information and constraint. 
Factors including need to help people, need for people, anomie, 
interpersonal aggression, need for structure and order, and devine 
fate control were assessed by the conceptual systems test (Harvey, 
et. al., 1966). Since this portion of the study was essentially 
exploratory, specific hypotheses as to eventual outcomes were not 
generated. 
The final objective of the study was an attempt to resolve 
conflicting data concerning the exact nature of the relationship 
between information and constraint. Since hypothesized combinations 
of these variables have been employed in the development of models 
of ideology and political behavior, it seems especially important 
that the relationship between them be specified and understood. 
Therefore, an effort was made to replicate the nonmonotonic relation-
ship reported by Jones and Rambo (1973) using a new sample and more 
precise instrumentation. 
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CHAPTER II 
INSTRUMENTS 
·Both·studies required the development of ·instruments to measure 
information and constraint. As previously indicated, it was intended 
that these instruments be objective and easily administered. For 
the·constraint variable an instrument capable of estimating consistency 
on an individual subject basis was desired. As a consequence, the 
following scaling procedures were performed. 
-The Individual Measure of Constraint 
In order to develop a measure of constraint from which a single 
subject's score cou\d be derived, it was assumed that constraint would 
be best represented by consistent responses to attitude items which 
are related or similar in terms of the sentiment reflected in each. 
Similarity was construed to mean a connection between the items based 
on a consideration of the underlying issues.and orientations contained 
in the items. This definition does not imply similarity based solely 
on the particular referent objects or subject matter involved (e.g. 
belief in God), but rather an association derived from.basic attitude 
positions (e.g. liberalism-conservatism). Thus, if two items both 
espouse conservative views toward their respective referents, one would 
expect the highly constrained subject to endorse, reject, or respond 
neutrally to both-items. On the other hand, the.low constraint 
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individual would not be as.likely to·respond consistently due to the 
-ambiialence inherent in such·a person's typical.stance on matters of 
opinion. It is recognized that response consistency does not, by 
itself, indicate·a logical process in the·conaotation of formal 
definitions of that term where beliefs are derived in a prescribed 
fashion from certain.presuppositions. Inconsistent responding would 
seem, however, to imply one of two alternatives: either the subject's 
beliefs are.indeed inconsistent and possibly illogical, or the items 
are not actually related. 
It was assumed that the.best indicator of item similarity would 
be-a statistical index of interrelatedness or association between 
pairs of attitude items computed for a substantial number of subjects. 
Data estimating intercorrelations among responses to attitude items 
for 753 subjects was available from the Jones and Rambo study (1973). 
Constraint in that-instance was defined as the·average interitem 
contingency coefficient of pairs of items from the Social Attitude 
Scale (Rambo, 1972). The·coefficient·was derived by constructing a 
5 x 5 matrix of the·response categories of Strongly Agree, Agree. 
etc. for any given pair·of items, and calculating the contingency 
coefficient from the observed frequencies in the matrix. This 
procedure was followed for each·possible pair combination and means 
were·computed for both forms of the Scale (A and L) and for each of 
five subject groups separately. Hence for ·all possible pairs on 
each foI'tll, five-· estimates of the degree of association were available. 
The magnitude of the coefficients varied of course from one information 
group to another, as indeed, this was the principal finding of the 
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study. Nonetheless, the average of the coefficients for a given pair 
would provide an index of the relative association of that pair versus 
any other pair of items. 
The first step in developing an individual measure of constraint 
was to inspect these coefficients to determine a representative 
degree of association. After an initial survey, the value of C = .45 
was arbitrarily established as a minimally acceptable coefficient 
magnitude. 1 Since the five information groups provided five estimates 
of the degree of association for any pair of items, the number of 
groups for which coefficients exceeding C = .45 were obtained was 
determined for each pair. This procedure, as well as all others in 
this section was performed for both forms of the SAS. Table I presents 
the results of this analysis. Item pairs were then selected for 
further consideration in the manner outlined in Table II. To determine 
the overall level of association for the item pairs thus selected, 
the five coefficients per pair were summed and means were calculated. 
It was also desirable to determine the extent to which a given 
pair of items could discriminate between groups with discernably 
different levels of con~traint. It was assumed that an adequate test 
of the discriminability of an item pair would be provided by the 
total magnitude of differences between the coefficients of the given 
information groups. This would hold so long as the observed 
differences for an item pair were in the same direction as the total 
sample. In the Jones and Rambo study the highest (I) and lowest (V) 
1 
The maximum value of this statistic is equal to the square root 
of 1 minus 1 over n, in this case .86. 
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information groups obtained higher average contingency coefficients 
than the three middle information groups. Also, the second highest 
(II) and next to the lowest (IV) groups yielded a greater index of 
constraint than did the middle information group (III). This was true 
for both forms of the SAS. Thus, for each remaining item pair (i.e. 
those not eliminated by the procedure outlined in Table II) the 
algebraic sum was then calculated for the following six coefficient 
comparisons: I - II; I - III; II - III; IV - III; V - III; V - IV. 
Means were computed as the measure of discriminability with higher 
means indicating greater discriminability. Appendix D summarizes 
the results of these analyses. 
Form 
A 
L 
TABLE ·1 
FREQUENCY OF !TEM PAIRS WITH CONTINGENCY 
COEFFICIENTS EXCEEDING C = .45 
Number of Coefficients > .45 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
691 208 62 17 8 4 
559 264 109 36 12 10 
Forty-four item pairs from each form were selected beginning 
with those possessing the highest mean contingency coefficient and 
discriminability scores simultaneously. The average contingency 
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coefficient (i.e., the mean of the means) for the item pairs selected 
was .4601 for form A and .4880 for form L. Mean discriminability 
scores were 39.2272 and 41.2500 respectively. Hence form L constitutes 
the better measure of constraint as regards the obtained indexes of 
association and discriminability. 
TABLE II 
INITIAL CONSTRAINT ITEM PAIR SELECTION PROCESS 
Criterion Number of Pairs Selected 
All pairs with 5 coefficients exceeding .45 
All pairs with 4 coefficients exceeding .45 
All pairs with 3 coefficients exceeding .45 
All pairs with 2 coefficients exceeding .45 
with the following limitations: (1) only 
if one of the coefficients was obtained by 
an information group with high overall 
constraint, or (2) if one of the items in 
the pair showed a pattern of high coeffi-
cients in its pairings with other items 
All pairs with at least 1 coefficient of 
.55 if not previously selected 
Total Number of Pairs Selected 
Form A Form L 
4 
8 
17 
55 
24 
108 
10 
12 
36 
97 
4 
159 
To determine the comparability of scores from the individual 
constraint scale to previous measures of constraint, the data of the 
Jones and Rambo study (1973) were reanalyzed with the new individual 
constraint procedure. Specifically, responses to the SAS item pairs 
selected above were compared for each subject. If the responses to 
both items were identical or similar, 1 point was added to the 
constraint total. The following item pair combinations were 
considered indicative of constraint and scored accordingly; any 
combination of strongly agree and agree, any combination of strongly 
disagree and disagree; and two undecided responses. This scoring 
procedure was reversed when the item pair contained both a liberal 
and a conservative item, e.g. responses of agree and disagree would 
be scored as constraint. Means were-calculated for each information 
group and are presented in Table III, as well as the average contin-
gency coefficients reported by Jones and Rambo. Table III indicates 
that the relative ranks among the five groups has remained the same 
( i. e, I) II) III 4 IV<. V) for both forms of the scale. Figure 1 
suggests that the essential U-shaped nature of the information and 
constraint relationship has not been.altered. The·primary difference 
between these functions and those reported in Jones and Rambo is that 
the individual measure of constraint appears to create greater and 
more equivalent separations between the five groups. This is not 
surprising since the new method of determining constraint possesses 
the advantage of being based only on comparisons between items with 
demonstrated association and discriminability, while the previous 
method consisted of means of all possible comparisons. However, 
the principle gain of this technique is the possibility of assigning 
constraint scores to individual subjects. As previously noted, 
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this allows for a more flexible experimental use of the constraint 
concept, in which it can be used as either an independent or dependent 
variable and more precise comparisons can be made with related 
concepts and behaviors. 
Information 
Group 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
v 
TABLE III 
MEAN CONSTRAINT AS A FUNCTION OF INFORMATION 
Form A 
Mean 
Contingency 
Coefficient 
(Original 
Estimate) 
.384 
.376 
.. 337 
.347 
.362 
Mean 
Individual 
Constraint 
(New 
Estimate) 
21.85 
20. 72 
19.21 
19.95 
20.32 
Form 
Mean 
Contingency 
Coefficient 
(Original 
Estimate) 
.402 
.• 401 
.342 
.356 
.378 
L 
Mean 
Individual 
Constraint 
(New 
Estimate) 
24.10 
22.76 
21.89 
23.30 
24.30 
At the beginning of the present study it was decided that 
comparability of the two methods of deriving constraint would 
serve as an adequate demonstration of validity for present purposes 
and this was achieved. This of course does not exhaust all of the 
procedures which could be employed to demonstrate validity, not 
to mention the·question of reliability. For example, further 
investigations are needed in order to test the underlying assumption 
that individual constraint scores·are indicative of a tendency 
toward logical thinking. 
Political Information Scale 
A 50-item multiple choice test was used to establish the level 
of information. Each item had five alternative answers only one of 
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which was correct. The test was conceived as an objective measure 
of a subject's knowledge of current events in the areas of national 
and international affairs, thus items were constructed so as to 
measure the amount of information about recent events or their 
consequences. An attempt was made to limit item content to essentially 
factual material. 
Form A 
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Figure 1. Mean Individual Constraint as a Function of Information 
Initially, 103 items were generated requiring that the subject 
correctly respond to questions concerning political figures, events, 
symbols, and parties, as well as legislation, judicial decisions, 
and political philosophy. These items were administered to a sample 
of 110 University of Tulsa undergraduate students enrolled in 
general psychology and other lower division psychology courses. 2 
As indicated in Figure 2, the distribution of information scores 
showed that the majority of subjects answered about half of the items 
correctly. The obtained scores varied from 33% to 84% correct 
with a mean of 55.51% and a median of 54.5%. 
In order to select items which would discriminate between 
subjects actually possessing different amounts of political knowledge 
the information scores were divided into three approximately equal 
groups. The resultant groups were as follows: hlgh information 
group (H), 61%.- 84%, (N=39); middle information group (M), 50% -
60%, (N=35); and low information group (L), 33% - 49%, (N=36). 
All subjects with the same information score were.placed in the 
same group, thus accounting for the slight discrepancies in size. 
The percentage of those subjects passing each item was then 
calculated for each group and the total sample. The first criterion 
of retention was based on these percentages. An item was retained 
if the percentage of passing was highest for the H group, next 
36 
2This was a unique sample which did not overlap with other 
samples in the study. When.it was determined that 5 of the subjects 
participating in the information test validation had also participated 
in other phases of the study, data collected from them in other 
phases were discarded. 
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highest for the M group and lowest for the L group. This procedure 
resulted in the elimination of 28 items, or 27% of the original set 
of items. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of Information Scores: Validation Sample 
To further determine the discriminability of the remaining items 
a line was plotted between a point representing the percent passing 
for the H group and for the L group of each item. The M group was 
also located on each graph mid-way between the Hand L points. The 
ability of each.item·to discriminate between the three groups was 
thus the distance (in percentage points) between the Hand L groups 
and the relative closeness of the M point to the H-L line. Both 
procedures were performed for each item and the resultant scores 
were ranked according to discriminability (i.e., from most to least 
discriminating items). The rank scores from both procedures were 
then summed to provide an index of overall discriminability among 
the three groups. Table IV represents the location of each item 
according to the combined discriminability ranks and item difficulty 
(percentage of total sample passing the item). Fifty items for the 
final version of the scale were selected from this matrix according 
to the criteria of high discriminaoility (i.e. low combined rank 
scores) and representation of the observed range of item difficulty. 
The average item difficulty of those selected was 59.36%. The 
·information scale is reproduced in Appendix E, and Appendix F 
contains the item analysis data. 
Previous writers have cautioned against the cavalier use of 
objective tests of political knowledge such as the one described 
above (e.g. Redford, et. al., 1968). Generally three arguments are 
proposed to suggest the limitations of such instruments. First, 
while many subjects may lack the ability to correctly identify 
objective characteristics of a given political leader or event, 
this does not necessarily mean·that this subject does not know 
anything about the leader or event. For example, Robinson (1967) 
has suggested that political infoilllation may be retained by most 
people in evaluative terms, i.e. while perhaps unable to identify 
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Item 
Difficultv 11 - 20 1 21 - 30 : 31 - 40 
I I 91-100 
I 
81-90 I 
I ! i 71-80 62* ' ' 
61-70 ' 53* i 
I 
'36* 39* i 
' 51-60 25* 48* i 63* 
I 
' 41-50 96* 
i ! 31-40 81* 
j ! 
21-30 i i 
I I 11-20 i i 
. ! l ! 0-10 i • 
*Items selected for final scale. 
TABLE IV 
INFORMATION ITEM SELECTION MATRIX 
Combined Discriminabilitv Ranks 
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I 16 59 
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the official title of Henry Kissinger, a subject may· be quite able to 
indicate whether or not he likes Mr. Kissinger. Secondly, a problem 
of specificity may be involved. Continuing the example, a subject 
may be able to recall what Mr. Kissinger does or the events with 
which he is associated without remembering a title designation. 
Finally, tests which limit responses may be biased against some 
subjects in that the level of information should be expected to 
increase as a function of the perceived relevance of the subject 
matter of the item to the subject. Thus questions concerning 
seemingly distant international events or vague distinctions of 
political philosophy may be perceived to have little relevance to 
many subjects, thus lower information scores might result. 
While the validity of these considerations is not questioned, 
it was deemed appropriate to use an objective multiple-choice test 
for several reasons. First are the obvious advantages of objective 
tests such as the ease of construction, scoring, administration, etc. 
Secondly, while evaluative and relevance dimensions should indeed 
be related to the amount of information possessed by a subject, 
there is no reason to believe that the "true" level of information 
would not be highly correlated with an objective estimate of· 
information. Tqis is especially the case since the present instrument 
samples a wide variety of topics. Also, as with any other test, 
the information test was construed as a sample of, in this case, 
political knowledge which could yield relative differences between 
subjects, and it was not assumed that such a test could exhaust the 
information possessed by a given subject. 
The Social Attitude Scale 
Since the development and validation of the SAS has been 
thoroughly described elsewhere (Rambo, 1972) it is sufficient to 
indicate its essential characteristics. The SAS is a Likert-type 
scale which was used to assess constraint in the present study. 
Originally it was constructed to measure the liberalsim-conservatism 
domain. The scale consists of alternate forms containing 44 items 
each. Form A contains 33 items worded in a conservative direction 
and 11 liberal items, while form L has 38 and 6 items, respectively. 
The standard response categories (e.g. strongly agree, agree, 
undecided, disagree, and strongly disagree) are provided. The SAS 
is scored by assigning weights 1 - 5 to the·above categories (higher 
scores indicate more conservative responses) and calculating the 
sum. Che weighting procedure is reversed for liberal items. 
Item content consists of general propositions concerning the 
nature of man, social order, social change, and traditions. The 
author argued that specific attitudes represent derivations from 
such basic assumptions and judgments. Thus the SAS is thought to 
measure more central and enduring underlying values than do scales 
consisting of questions concerning specific political or social 
issues. Such a scale lends itself to the measurement of constraint 
in that responses to these basic considerations should be expected 
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to reflect greater logical consistency as compared to responses to 
more specific items which are often time bound due to developing 
events and changing social custom. By measuring general orientations 
to the nature of human interaction the SAS also provides an index 
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of the extent to which subjects have molded their impressions and 
feelings into a consistent and stable belief system as opposed to a 
fragmented, transitory view of social life. 
Validational procedures exceediqg the usual practice for 
attitude scales were performed in the process of item selection. 
Following the standard Likert internal consistency analysis three 
sets of liberal and conservative affiliation groups were identified 
and tested. These groups consisted of college and adult samples 
as well as both black and white subjects. Items were selected on 
the basis of discriminability scores between the pairs of liberal 
and conservative groups. Factor analytic procedures suggested that 
the factor structure of the items was stable across samples, and 
that three or four factors, including a general factor labeled 
liberalism~conservatism, account for the major proportion of 
' 
variance. When the surviving items were separated into alternate 
forms various items statistics such as factor loadings, mean scale 
values, variances and item discriminability values were equalized 
as closely as possible. A subsequent administration of both forms 
to the same sample confirmed the comparability of the two forms. 
Additional research by Rambo (1973) investigated the predictive 
validity of the scale. Liberal and conservative groups were 
constructed on the basis of the SAS scores and predictions were 
made concerning differences between these groups on four personality 
variables. All predictions were realized as conservatives manifested 
significantly greater status concern and rigidity, while liberals 
obtained higher external control and social alienation scores. 
The Conceptual Systems Test (CST, Harvey, et. al., 1966) was 
also administered to determine cognitive and-personality differences 
between subjects manifestipg various amounts of information and 
constraint. This test was originally developed to measure salient 
aspects of cognitive style. The CST consists of 49 items which are 
scored using the conventional 5-point Agree-Disagree response 
categories. Six sub-areas may be scored including divine fate 
control, need for structure and order, need to help people, need for 
people, interpersonal aggression, and anomie. These six scores were 
used to assess personality and cognitive differences in the present 
study. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Subjects 
The sample for the principal study consisted of 253 subjects 
re~ruited from undergraduate psychology courses at the University of 
Tulsa. Forty-four percent of the subjects were male and 56% female. 
The mean age was 22.5 years and the respective class standings were 
as follows: freshman 34.4%; sophomore, 25.7%; junior, 27.7%; and 
senior, 12.2%, Political party affiliation was almost evenly split 
between the major parties as 41.5% indicated that they supported 
the Republican Party, 41.4% identified with the Democrats, while 
16.6% of the subjects classified themselves as Independent. Political 
involvement was extensive for a college sample in that 83% of the 
subjects reported that they had registered to vote; 79% had voted, 
and 34.5% reported that they had participated in one form or another 
of campaign activity. The largest major area of study consisted 
of the social sciences which·comprised 32% of the sample. The 
proportions of other majors were as follows: technical and vocational 
(e.g criminal justice and nursing), 16%; physical and biological 
sciences, 12%; education, 11%; art and humanities, 10%; business, 8%; 
undeclared majors, 6%; and engineering, 3%. Additionally, 55% of 
the subjects were local residents and the mean grade point average 
was 2.97 for the total sample. 
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In the second study data was collected for 84 subjects enrolled 
in two sections of the Introductory Psychology course at Tulsa 
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Junior College. The sample consisted of 64.3% males and 35.7% females. 
Surprisingly, upperclassmen were represented (e.g. summer term special 
students) and the college class proportions were as follows: freshman, 
41.7%; sophomore, 29.8%; junior, 21.4%; and senior; 7.1%. Eighty-
one percent of the sample reported having registered to vote, while 
84.5% had actually voted and 27.4% had participated in political 
campaigning. This sample was somewhat older than that of the first 
study as was reflected in the average age of 25.39. Again, the 
social sciences accounted for the largest group of majors, 35.7%, 
followed by technical and vocational, 22.6%; business, 17.8%; art 
and humanities, 11.9%; undeclared, 4.8%; and both biological sciences 
and education with 3.6% each. Also as before, both the Democrat and 
Republican parties commanded equal support (45.2% each) while 9.5% 
of the subjects described themselves as Independents. 
Procedure 
Study No. 1 
The principal study consisted of two distinct phases. In the 
first phase constraint and information levels were determined by 
administering the Social Attitude Scale (Rambo, ~972) and the 
political information test (the 50-item, objective information 
test described above) to 370 undergraduate psychology students. 
These subjects were also given a social issues questionnaire which 
elicits like-dislike responses to 10 political figures and favor~ 
oppose responses to 35 social and political issues. These scales 
were administered during a week long series of out-of-class testing 
sessions. The subjects received minor course credit for their 
part ic ipa t ion. 
For both parts of the social issues questionnaire the subjects 
were required to respond on a six-point scale defined at the end 
points by either like-dislike or favor-oppose depending on the item 
(see Appendix A). The middle category had been omitted to prevent 
noncommittal responses. However, five subjects insisted that 
their evaluations properly required an undecided response to one 
of the key items. These subjects were allowed to finish and 
received credit for participating, but were disqualified from 
further consideration in the study. 
Responses to the evaluation of President Nixon and twenty of 
the issue items were checked to determined inconsistencies. The 
remaining political figures and issues contained in the social 
issues questionnaire were considered "filler" items. Inconsistencies 
were defined prior to the experiment as any one of the four 
combinations presented in Table V. 
Table VI represents the four issue-Nixon inconsistencies 
which were observed among supjects who indicated that they liked 
Mr. Nixon as well as the four most common inconsistencies for 
those who disliked him. 
Sixty-one subjects were elim;i.nated because they responded with 
three or fewer of the above inconsistencies. After an interval of 
one week the remaining 304 subjects were contacted to participate 
in the secon4 phase of the study. Subjects who had participated 
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early in the week in the first phase were contacted first so that an 
approximately equal separation of time between the phases was true 
for all subjects. Additional minor course credit was offered for 
participation in phase two. 
TABLE V 
DEFINITIONS OF INCONSISTENCY 
Evaluation of Nixon Evaluation of Issue 
Like 
Like 
Dislike 
Dislike 
Oppose issue favored by Nixon 
Favor issue opposed by Nixon 
Oppose issue opposed by Nixon 
Favor issue favored by Nixon 
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The second phase of the study consisted of a personal interview 
conducted by a psychology graduate student with each subject not 
previously eliminated. During the initial portion of the interview 
each subject was asked to provide demographic and background 
information. The data collected at this point included age and 
sex of the subject; grade point average and college classification; 
whether or not the subject had registered to vote, voted, or 
participated in political activities (e.g. campaigning and fund 
raising); the political party, if any, with which the subject most 
TABLE VI 
OBSERVED INCONSISTENCIES 
Evaluation Group 
Issues Like Dislike 
Nixon Subjects Nixon Subiects 
Reduce aid to science research Favor Oppose 
Increase medicare Favor Oppose 
Increase aid to education Oppose Favor 
Devaluation of dollar Favor Oppose 
Revenue sharing Favor Favor 
Improved relations with China Favor Favor 
Capital punishment Favor Favor 
Federal aid to private schools Favor Favor 
closely identified; hometown; and the subjects' estimate of the 
relative impact of various news sources on-their attitudes and 
information. 
Next, the subjects were reminded of their responses to one of 
the four social issues which was inconsistent relative to their 
evaluation of Nixon. For example, the interviewer might say .. 
"I see you oppose improving relations with Red China, can you tell 
me why?" Following the iubs-equ.ent response the interviewer would 
confront the subject with the inconsistency, e.g. "But you also 
indicated that you like President Nixon, and yet he has traveled 
to China and has publically stated his affirmation of rapproachment 
with China. How do you account for the apparent contradiction?" 
Although the exact language used by the interviewer changed from 
issue to issue and across subjects, two essential elements were 
always included. That is, for each issue the interviewer would 
elicit the subjects' position and then present the inconsistency 
~ 
vis a vis President Nixon. The order of presentation of the issues 
for which inconsistencies existed was randomized. 
Each of the four verbal responses of the subject to the 
confrontations was subjectively scored by the interviewer to discern 
several aspects of the response. First, numerical tallies were 
kept of the number of probes required and requests for information 
by the subjects. Probes referred to any prompting the interviewer 
used to elicit a response such as ••• "can you tell me more?. 
go on •.• can you explain more fully?" Probes were-used only 
when the subjects failed to say anything·or when the answer was 
vague, unintelligible, etc. Requests for information referred 
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to the incidents in which the subject asked a question of the 
interviewer, e.g. • • . "What do you .mean? . • • what I s the purpose 
of that question?" This category was also scored when the subject 
requested substantive information concerning the issue under 
discussion, e.g .•. "When did the President say that? . • • what 
do you mean devaluation of the dollar?" The interviewer referred 
all questions concerning the purpose of the experiment to the 
debriefing to be held later. Substantive questions were answered 
only to the extent that it insured the credibility of the confrontation, 
e.g. "The President announced his views of this in a televised 
speech last March." 
The interviewer also scored the subjects' explanations according 
to three variables developed by Kessel (1965) to judge the cognitive 
components of political interview data. These variables were as 
follows: 
1. Information support (categories: high, medium, 
low). An estimate of the amount of information 
employed by the subject to explain the original 
position relative to the issue and to resolve 
or explain the contradiction. Examples: high 
information would be scored when the subject 
offered detailed and correct information to 
support his contentions; medium information 
was indicated when some information which bore 
directly on the question was emitted; the low 
information category was used to denote either 
a subject who offered little or no information, 
e.g. one who relied extensively on feelings 
·or intuition, or a subject who employed 
erroneous, vague, or confused information. 
2. Time perspective (categories: immediate, 
intermediate, long.range). An estimate of the 
temporal frame of reference used to justify 
the subject's position. The present, weeks 
or months, years, generations and historical 
per~-pectives exemplify applications of the 
categories. If more than one time perspective 
was indicated, the one of longer duration was 
scored. This dimension was, in some cases, 
inferred from the subject's verbalizations 
rather than being directly emitted. It must also 
be noted that issues would be expected to differ 
inherently concerning the duration of conse-
quences. stemming from the issµe. However, the 
measure was obtained in an attempt to estimate 
the extent to which a subject tends to conceive 
of political events and issues in relatively 
long or short term perspectives • 
. 3. Geographical perspective (categories: local, 
national, international). An estimate of the 
breadth of consequences employed to justify 
the position·of the subject. The categories 
are self-explanatory with the exception that 
local was conceived to mean everything up to 
and including state-wide perspectives. Again, 
these estimates were often inferences and the 
more inclusive category was scored when two 
or more were emitted. The basic thrust of these 
judgments was an attempt to discover the subject's 
geographical anchors or "political life space" 
when discussing the impact of an issue. 
To test subject sensitivity to the face-to-face dissonance or 
inconsistency arousal provided by the confrontation, an attempt 
was made to measure the subject's tendency to resolve or deny the 
suggested inconsistency. At the same time the sophistication of 
the resolution or denial was taken into account. This was achieved 
by scoring each of the four responses as one of the following: 
a. Supported resolution. This category was scored 
if the subject resolved the inconsistency by 
shifting one of the evaluations of either Nixon 
or the issue and giving explanations of the 
change or arguments supporting the chang~. 
b. Unsupported resolution. If the subjects 
resolved the inconsistency by summarily 
changing his view of either Nixon or the 
issues without indicating the reasons 
involved, this category would be checked. 
Unsupported resolution was also indicated 
when the subject manifested a lack of under-
standing or interest but changed one of the 
evaluations anyway. 
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c. Support denial. This designation was used to 
denote a case in which the subject disagreed 
that an inconsistency was contained in the two 
evaluations, and went on to explain why, or 
supplied additional information or arguments 
to support the denial. 
d. Unsupport denial. This category was appropriate 
when the subject claimed that no inconsistency 
existed without elaborating, or when the subject 
erroneously or without support denied the 
President's public position on a particular 
issue. 
Since most of the subjects who participated in the principal 
study were students of the present author, debriefing was conducted 
collectively during class periods. An attempt was made to integrate 
the study into the course content concerning theoretical and 
·, 
experimental aspects of psychology. Although the debriefing dealt 
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mostly with theoretical concerns, questions about the purpose, design, 
or results (insofar as they were available at the time) were 
entertained. Subjects not enrolled in the author's classes were 
notified by announcement of the opportunity to discuss the study 
with the experimenter. Also, subjects who were interested were 
given individual feedback concerning the scores they obtained on 
the political information and constraint tests. 
Since the only deceptions required to perform the study were 
the withholding of information concerning what the tests measured 
(although in all cases but one this is obvious), what the purpose 
of the study was, and the author's role as experimenter, it was 
felt that the subjects would not feel exploited. A questionnaire 
distributed during the debri~fing indicated that this was so 
(see Appendix B). For example, 100% of the respondents indicated 
that they did not feel exploited, pressured, or stressed, 82% 
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claimed that their attitudes had not been manipulated or changed, 
87% reported that they thought their participation and the subsequent 
debriefing was worthwhile and informative for them and although 79% 
said that their chief motive for participating was the extra course 
credit which had been tendered, 65% reported that they would 
participate in a similar experiment again whether or not credit 
was offered. Also, all but two of the respondents (99%) indicated 
that they believed the project to be worthwhile from the standpoint 
of the experimenter. 
In the response to an·open-ended question requesting the 
subjects' guesses concerning the intent of the experiment, most 
of the subjects indicated only marginal awareness as suggested by 
such references as "opinion survey," "testing political attitudes," 
and "the ability to stand up for one's beliefs," etc. Curiously, 
only 17 subjects (6.7%) mentioned any concept related to attitude 
consistency. These responses were elicited from the subjects at 
the beginning of the debriefing so their hypotheses concerning the 
purpose of the study were made without the benefit·of feedback. 
From the responses to the debriefing questionnaire it can be 
argued with reasonable assurance that the subjects were not harmed 
b.y;~the experience and that, in their perception at least, their 
time was not wasted in a meaningless exercise. The debriefing 
also suggested that the credibility of the experimental manipulation 
was not jeopardized by the subjects' awareness of the exact nature 
of the study. Although these post-experimental subject impressions 
were solicited with a guarantee of anonymity, it must be acknowledged 
that such requests from a ''prestigeous scmrce" might conceivably 
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yield self-fulfilling results. Hol4ever, since the post questionnaire 
results suggested substantial consensus and since no discernable sign 
of disenchantment was detected, it was concluded that the post 
questionnaire accurately reflected the subjects' true feelings. 
Study No. 2 
Data for the second study were collected during the class 
periods of two sections·of the Introductory Psychology course at 
Tulsa Junior College. In addition to the SAS and the political 
information test, the subjects completed the Conceptual Systems 
Test. Following the administration of these scales in the order 
presented above, self report questionnaires were distributed which 
requested the following information: age and sex of subject, college 
classification; whether the subject had registered to vote, voted, 
or participated in political campaigning; an estimate of the :· 
importance of one's vote in determining the outcome of a Presidential 
election, and voting regularity; an estimate of the extent to which 
the subjects perceived a recent shift in attitudes concerning 
political affairs; use of political information sources; and the 
party, if any, with which the subject personally identified. 
Additionally, subjects who voted in the 1972 Presidential election 
were asked to indicate whether or not they had voted a straight 
party ticket and the time at which they reached their decision 
concerning their presidential choice. Appendix C presents this 
questionnaire. 
Eighty-five subjects participated in the second study with 
one subject eliminated due to the failure to properly complete all 
of the testing forms. Debriefing was not conducted for the subjects 
in this study because no experimental manipulation was involved 
and due to time limitations. Instead, subjects were assured of the 
·anonymity of their·responses (names were not required to collate 
test forms) and were simply told that the experimenter was 
interested in comparing the results of the various tests. As 
before, the purpose of each test (except the SAS which was scored 
for constraint·rather than liberalsim-conservatism) was rather 
·transparent. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Study No. 1 
The information test was scored and the scores were converted 
into percentages. The distribution ranged from 16% - 96% correct 
with a mean of 61.42 and a median of 62. As Figure 3 indicates, 
a majority of the subjects (69%) answered half or more.·of the 
items correctly. Three groups were constructed by dividing the 
information scores into approximately equal thirds. Both forms 
of the SAS were scored for constraint and the resulting sums were 
combined for each subject. The combined constraint scores varied 
from 25 to 86 within the possible range of Oto 88. The mean was 
46.79 and the median was 43. Figure 4 represents the frequency 
of constraint scores at various magnitudes. Subjects scoring 
above and below the middle constraint value (i.e. the middle 
score of the range of possible constraint scores, 44.5; not the 
observed median) were dichotomized within the information ra.nges 
created above, resulting in the six experimental groups outlined 
in Table VII. 
To determine whether the various levels of the two independent 
variables represented subjects~who actually differed in terms of 
information and constraint, tests of significance were performed. 
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The information score means of the three information groups were 
as follows: high information, 81.88; middle information, 61.31; 
and low information, 40.05. An analysis of variance was calculated 
and the resulting F ratio equaled 18.51 (p(.01). Summing across 
information groups, the high constraint subjects achieved an average 
constraint score of 59.36 while low constraint subjects showed a 
mean of 36.29. The uncorrelated t difference between means was 
highly significant (t=21. 76, p( • 01). Thus the procedure used to 
delineate the six experimental groups.appeared to have segregated 
subjects possessing differential amounts of the two variables. 
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TABLE VII 
EXPERil1ENTAL GROUPS CONSTRUCTED FROM 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE COMBINATIONS 
Group Information Constraint 
Information Constraint n Range Mean Range Mean 
High (H) High (H) 55 72-94 81. 7 45-86 64.1 
High (H) Low (L) 27 72-96 82.2 29-43 37.4 
Middle (M) High (H) 28 54-66 61.6 45-72 56.2 
Middle (M) Low (L) 65 52-70 61.2 25-44 34.9 
Low (L) High (L) 33 24-48 41.3 45-70 53.6 
Low (L) Low (L) 45 16-50 39.2 31-43 37.6 
It is interesting to note that the mean information score for 
high constraint subjects was 65.38 and 58.08 for the low constraint 
subjects. This difference was significant (t=3.28, p(..01). The 
average constraint values for the high, middle, and low information 
groups were 55.30, 41.31, and 44.37 respectively. These differences 
were also significant (F=3.27, p.(.05). Figure 5 represents mean 
constraint as a function of information. The shape of the curve 
provides further confirmation of the U-shaped information and 
constraint relationship reported by Jones and Rambo. This -appeared 
especially significant since these results were obtained with a new 
information test, a different sample, and a different method for 
calculating constraint. Although Figure 5 also indicates that the 
low information group-obtained a substantially lower mean constraint 
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score than did the high information group, this result nonetheless 
supports the contention that the relationship is nonmonotonic and 
that constraint does not vary as a linear function-of information, 
regardless of the exact shape of the curve. 
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In order to examine the effects of the inconsistency confrontation 
the degree of inconsistency was determined for each subject. This 
was achieved by calculating the sepaTation, in scale units, between 
the evaluation of President Nixon and the inconsistent attitude as 
measured by the social issues questionnaire. Weights of 1 to 6 
were assigned to the individual scale items beginning at the 
unfavorable pole (i.e. dislike or oppose) of the item. For example, 
if a subject responded with maximum approval of Nixon (score: 6) 
and maximum opposition to revenue sharing (score: :J_) the incon-
sistency score would equal 5 units for that item. The inconsistency 
scores were summed across the four items for each subject and had a 
possible total range o:Lii- - 20 for the first administration of the 
social issues questionnaire. Inconsistency scores were·obtained in 
the same manner for the post-manipulation administration in which 
the possible range was O - 20. The truncated range of the pre-test 
scores resulted from the fact that items and subjects were selected 
on the basis of the presence of inconsistencies, and thus a score 
below the value of 4 was unattainable. It should be noted that a 
post-test score·of 3 or less necessarily resulted from a reversal 
of the responses to either one or more of the issues or President 
Nixon. 
Changes in the inconsistency score represented attitude change. 
The inconsistencies made salient by the confrontation would be 
expected to arouse dissonance and result in significant shifts in 
attitudes. · Table VIII presents the mean pre:-post inconsistency 
scores for the six experimental groups as well as means for each 
level of information and constraint. From Table VIII it would 
appear that subjects·characterized by higher levels of information 
and constraint resisted the experimental manipulation more than did 
lower information and constraint subjects, as hypothesized. However, 
Table VIII also suggests the possibility that there are pre-test 
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differences in inconsistencies scores among the experimental groups. 
Significant differences between the average original inconsistency 
scores of each group would render significant pre-post changes 
difficult to interpret and such differences were not anticipated. 
As a result before any pre-post analysis was performed a 3 x 2 
factorial, weighted-means analysis was calculated for the pre-test 
inconsistency data alone. Unfortunately, this test proved to be 
significant for both information (F=l2.85, p(.01) and constraint 
(F=l2.87, p<..,.01). 
TABLE VIII 
MEAN INCONSISTENCY SCORES 
GrouE 
Information Constraint n Pre Post Difference 
H H 55 14.04 13.35 .69 
H 1 27 9.52 8.22 1.30 
M H 28 13.18 11.18 2.00 
M 1 65 13.60 10.92 2.68 
1 H 33 16.03 12.54 3.48 
L L 45 14.44 10.11 4.33 
H 
-
82 12.55 11. 79 .76 
M 
-
93 13 .47 11.00 2.47 
L 
-
78 15.06 11.14 3.92 
-
H 116 14.36 12,69 1.67 
-
1 137 13.07 10.12 2.95 
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Thus, the six groups differed in original inconsistency scores. 
Table VIII indicates that much,of the discrepancy derives from one 
group (high,information·low constraint) •. Furthermore, Table VIII 
indicates that at both the high and low information levels the high 
·constraint group shows a greater degree of inconsistency than does 
the low constraint group. This pattern is surprising and a simple, 
persuasive explanationis not available. It·is possible that·either 
the individual measure of constraint or the SIQ were inadequate 
in some fashion. It is also possible that there exists some inherent 
inconsistency.in the SIQ item comparisons. For example, some 
subjects argued during the.interview that the inconsistencies were 
Mr. Nixon's and not theirs. This idea seems at least plausible 
since these arguments were most often made by the high constraint-
1 high information group. Again, however, it must be acknowledged 
that the pre-test inconsistency score differences represent a 
weakness of the design the reasons for which are not easily discerned. 
Because some sort of statistical test of the,effects of the 
confrontation was needed despite this problem,.the decision was made 
to divide the intended 3 x 2 x 2 repeated measures design into 
three· separate analyses. A 2 x 2 analysis (two l'evels, of constraint 
x pre-post) was performed for each information.group. This procedure 
provided a test of the differential effects of constraint, and 
indirectly the effects, of information level. For ~xample, 
significant pre•post qifferences would confirm the ability·of the 
confrontation to elicit attitude change within a given information 
group. The pattern of pre-post differences across the three 
groups would suggest the relationship between information level and 
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attitude change. Attitude change.associated with levels of constraint 
would be found in the·interaction term, while significant differences 
in constraint would indicate that the inconsistency scores varied 
as a function of constraint. 
Tables IX through XI present the results of these analyses. As 
may be seen, only one of the principal hypotheses was supported by 
the data in that the high information group failed to show significant 
pre-post differences, while 1both middle and low information levels 
yielded ~ignificant pre-post differences. It is interesting to note 
that the F ratio is twice as large for the low group as compared to 
the middle.information group. The hypothesis that attitude change 
to resolve inconsis·te~c.y would vary as a function of the level of 
constraint was not confirmed due to the lack of significance of any 
of the interaction terms. ; Also, Tables IX through XI suggest the 
extent of inconsistency score differences between constraint groups 
in that both the high and low information.analyses indicated significant 
differences associated with levels of constraint. 
At this point, a significant depature from the usual practice 
of data analysis was made. This resulted from the fact that the 
summary data presented in Table VIII conveyed the strong impression 
that both of the major hypotheses had been confirmed and yet 
subsequent analysis revealed that differences in attitude change as 
a function of constraint were not significant. While the present 
author would agree that continued analysis which seeks only to confirm 
original hypotheses is inappropriate, it was felt that in this 
instance sufficient justification was available for further examination 
of the data. In other words, the data were not manipulated to "create" 
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statistical significance where important·. relationships obviously 
were abaent. Instead, the analysis was continued "as if" the 
constraint x pre-post interactions were significant since the pattern 
of results indicated that greater amounts of attitude change were 
associated with decreasing levels of both infonnation and constraint. 
For example, Figure 6 graphically indicates that at each level of 
information the low constraint group showed greater attitude change 
(i.e. mean pre-inconsistency score minus mean post-inconsistency 
score) than did the high constraint group. Although differences in 
attitude change are obviously greater as a function of information 
level, the constraint factor was also related to the average degree 
of change. In fact, the constraint effect was quite consistent 
across levels of information. 
Source 
Constraint 
Pre-Post 
Interaction 
Error 
**P ( .01 
TABLE IX 
CHANGES IN INCONSISTENCY SCORES BY TWO LEVELS 
OF CONSTRAINT: HIGH INFORMATION GROUP 
Analysis of Variance 
df SS MS F 
1 885.98 885.98 61.96** 
1 .9.06 9.06 .63 
1 3.32 3.32 .23 
160 2,287.97 14.30 
Source 
Constraint 
Pre-Post 
Interaction 
Error 
**P (.. 01 
Source 
Constraint 
Pre-Post 
TABLE X 
CHANGES IN INCONSISTENCY SCORES BY TWO LEVELS 
OF CONSTRAINT: MIDDLE INFORMATION GROUP 
Analysis of Variance 
df SS MS 
1 .28 .28 
F 
.02 
1 284.42 284.42 19.92** 
1 4.48 4.48 .31 
182 2,598.43 14.28 
TABLE XI 
CHANGES IN INCONSISTENCY SCORES BY TWO LEVELS 
OF CONSTRAINT: LOW INFORMATION GROUPS 
Analysis of Variance 
df SS MS F 
1 153.85 153.85 10.23** 
1 616.03 616.03 40.95** 
Interaction 1 6.79 6.79 .45 
Errbr 152 2,286.70 15.04 
**p< .01 
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Figure 6. Mean Attitude Change as a Function of Information and 
Constraint 
Therefore, tests of simple effects were performed, i, e. pre-post 
differences for each of the six independent variable groups separately. 
Table XII presents t values for these comparisons as well as corre-
lation coefficents for the relationship between pre and post 
inconsistency scores. Table XII indicates that decreasing levels of 
information and constraint yield increasingly significant pre-post 
attitude change differences with but one inversion of this pattern. 
This analysis also i~dicated that pre-post inconsistency changes were 
significant for all groups except one (high information-high constraint). 
Similarly, the correlation coefficients show a descending frend 
68 
with one inversion. Thus while higher information and constraint 
groups yielded less significant but more predictable pre-post 
changes, lower levels of these variables were associated with 
increasingly significant, but less predictable attitude shifts. 
TABLE XII 
CHANGES IN INCONSISTENCY SCORES BY SIX 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE GROUPS 
Group Mean Mean 
Information Constraint Pre Post Difference t r 
H H 14.04 13.35 .69 1.22 .80 
H L 9.52 8.22 1.30 2. 72** .66 
M H 13.18 11.18 2.00 3.51** .68 
M L 13.60 10.92 2.68 7.24** .61 
L H 16.03 12.54 3.48 5.29** .57 
L L 14.44 10.11 4.33 5.76** .22 
**P < .01 
These results suggest two conclusions which were not totally 
apparent at the conclusion of the initial analysis. First, infor-
mation was a better predictor of attitude change than was constraint. 
This could have resulted for at least two reasons. Either information 
was "in reality" more closely associated with the responses to the 
inconsistency confrontation, or, as previously suggested, the 
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technique of measuring constraint was less than entirely s.4tisfactory. 
The complexity of the constraint concept renders efforts to measure 
it quite difficult. Therefore, it is possible that the individual 
measure of constraint which attempts to differentiate on the basis 
of the similarity in responses to pairs of items simply does not 
reliably tap the more. basic concept of functional interdependence 
among attitude elements. Therefore further work examining the 
validity and reliability of this technique is needed. It is also 
possible that the procedure of dividing the constraint distribution 
failed to adequately separate subjects into groups which differed 
in constraint in a meaningful fashion. For example, Figure 4 suggests 
that the observed distribution of combined constraint scores was 
skewed in such a way as to indicate a possible "floor" effect for 
this variable. Moreover, the cutting point of 44.5 was determined 
prior to the experiment and thus without knowledge of this fact. 
Therefore, it is conceivable that the lack of significant results 
was due to the manner in which the constraint groups were formed, 
and that alternative procedures (e.g. using only the upper and lower 
thirds of the distribution, use of three levels of constraint instead 
of two, etc.) might have yielded differing results. The fact that 
non-significant but consistent differences in attitude change as 
a function of constraint were observed lends credence to this 
interpretation. 
Secondly, Table XII indicates that the inconsistency confrontation 
was m9re effective in eliciting attitude change than was originally 
l 
expected. Apparently this manipulation created strong pressures 
for change regardless of the information and constraint level of the 
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subject. Therefore it is possible that the strength of manipulation 
masked the effects of constraint. This conclusion would be tenable 
if the following two assumptions are valid: (1) if information and 
constraint were both related to the degree of change in inconsistency 
scores and. (2) if, as appears to ·be the case, the information test 
was simply a more efficient instrument in this instance than was 
the individual measure of constraint. 
In conclusion, the analysis was_hampered by shortcomings in the 
\ 
experimental design. In the view of the present author there is 
reason to believe that, as hypothesized, atti~ude change and response 
to the confrontation varied as an inverse function of the level of 
constraint. Supporting evidence for this contention was also found 
in the analysis of SIQ reversals, which is presented below. 
Therefore, while it has not been statistically demonstrated, 
discus.sion of the study reflects 1,t;he conclusion that both of the 
major hypotheses were supported. 
It was also advisable to test changes in inconsistency scores 
for subjects who indicated that they liked Mr. Nixon vs. those who 
did not. This was deemed necessary because ~o different sets of 
inconsistency confrontations were presented depending on the 
evaluation of Nixon. Therefore, it was possible that the tendency 
to resolve the inconsistency might have depended on the relative 
importance of the particular issues involved. Table XIII shows the 
mean pre-post ip.consistency scores for subjects favoring and opposing 
Nixon. Table XIII indicates that greater changes were observed among 
subjects who initially preferred Nixon; there were substantial 
differences in the overall inconsistency scores of Like vs. Dislike 
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subjects; and both groups yielded lower inconsistency scores in the 
post-test administration. A 2 x 2 analysis of variance (like-dislike x 
pre-post) indicated that pre-post (F = 14.70, p(.01) and evaluation 
group (F = 11.54, p(.01) differences were significant. However, 
the interaction term was not significant (F = 0.55) suggesting that"" 
the particular set of issues with which the subject was confronted 
had a negligible effect on observed changes in inc6nsistency scores. 
TABLE XIII 
MEAN INCONSISTENCY SCORES FOR SUBJECTS 
WHO LIKE AND DISLIKE NIXON 
Mean Inconsistency 
Evaluation, of Nixon Pre Post Difference 
\ 
Like 13.00 10.29 2. 71 
Dislike 15.02 13.29 1. 74 
The subjects' behavior during the interview itself was also of 
interest and is summarized in Table XIV, which presents percentages, 
by group of the tendency to resolve or deny the suggested incon-
sistencies. Also included in Table XIV are proportions for the 
remaining interview content variables. These variables were analyzed 
with three Chi-square tests each to enable a more definitive 
determination of the effects of information and constraint. This 
was achieved by analyzing the effects of information for low and 
TABLE XIV 
INTERVIE~ CONTENT EVALUATION 
X Requests Time Span 
Geographical Resolution-Denial Tendency 
Group Information Support Perspective Denial Resolution 
I c X Probes Information %H 1M %L %L-R %Int. ?.Inm. %Int. %Nat. %Loe. %Un. % Sun. .%Un. %Sun. 
H H .4500 .2700 22.72 60.45 16.81 13.63 81.36 5.00 44.54 41.81 13.63 18.63 8.18 30.45 44.72 
H L .2962 .5185 33.33 43.51 23.14 9.25 84.25 6.48 39.81 49.07 11.11 6.48 2.77 49.07 45.37 
M H .5000 .2857 16.96 56.25 26.78 10.71 71.42 17.85 33.03 41.07 25.89 17.85 15.17 42.85 24.10 
M L .3692 · .4461 13.84 55.00 31.15 13.46 70.76 15.76 35.00 46.53 18.46 20.07 8.84 30.69 35.32 
L H .4848 .3030 4.54 39.39 56.06 5.30 86.36 .8.33 30.30 43.18 26.51 35.60 4.54 48.48 11.36. 
L L .8888 .6888 1.66 47.77 50.55 3.33 62.22 34.44 15.00 43.88 41.11 39.44 2. 77 40.00 7.77 
H 
-
.4024 .3536 26.21 54.87 18.90 12.19 82.31 5.48 42.98 44.30 12.80 14.63 6.40 36.58 43.59 
M 
-
,4086 .3978 14. 78 55.37 29.83 12.63 70.96 16.39 34.40 44.89 20.69 21.50 10.75 35.75 31.98 
L 
-
.7179 .5256 2.88 44.23 52.88 4.16 72.43 23.39 21.47 43.58 34.93 37.82 3.52 49.35 9.29 
-
H .5258 .2844 16.16 53~44 30.38 10.56 80.38 9.05 37. 71 42.02 20.25 23.27 8.83 38.57 29.31 
-
L .5255 .5401 13.68 5~.36 35.94 9.30 70.62 20.07 29.37 46.16 24.45 25.18 5.65 41.60 28.28 
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high constraint subjects separately. Differences between high and 
low constraint subjects (summed across information groups) comprised 
the third test. To illustrate, Table XV presents the cell frequencies 
for the three tests performed to assess group differences in 
geographical perspective. The procedure was followed for all Chi-
square analyses1 in the two studies. 
Table XVI which presents Chi-square totals for the interview 
content variables, provides evidence that the tendency to resolve 
the inconsistencies was related to information level, but not to 
constraint. In order to determine whether or not the significant 
Chi-square totals for the tendency to resolve the issue during the 
interview were confounded with the sophistication of the answer 
(which was scored simultaneously), the supported vs. unsupported 
categories were collapsed and the three tests were recalculated. 
The resulting Chi-square totals were as follows: information (high 
constraint subjects), x2 = 6.79 (p~ .OS, v = 2); information (low 
constraint subjects), x2 = 23.68 (p ,.Ol, v = 2); and constraint, 
x2 = .19. Thus, while the sophistication of the response did 
apparently influence the judgment of the experimenter, especially 
for high constraint subjects, the basic pattern of results remained 
the same. That is, the tendency to' resolve was significantly 
greater for lower vs. higher information levels, while no significant 
differences were observed for different constraint groups. Table 
XVI also suggests that, as predicted, both high information and 
high constraint subjects tended, to a significant degree, to 
conceptualize political events in broader geographical and temporal 
units; that is, these subjects more frequently made reference to 
Factor Levels 
H 
M 
L 
TABLE XV 
OBSERVED CELL FREQUENCIES FOR THREE CHI-SQUARE 
TESTS OF GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE 
Information 
Test #1 I Test #2 
(High Constraint Subjects) (Low Constraint Subjects) 
Variable Categories 
Int. Nat. Loe. Int. Nat. Loe. 
98 92 30 43 53 12 
37 46 29 91 121 48 
40 57 35 27 79 74 
Constraint 
(All Subjects) 
Variable 
Category 
Factor Levels Int. Nat. Loe. 
H 175 195 94 
L 121 253 134 
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long range international consequences in discussing their attitudes, 
while lower information and constraint subjects expressed greater 
concern for the immediate and local impact of political events. 
Not suprisingly, information level was significantly related to the 
amount of information support perceived by the interviewer, while 
the constraint factor was not. 
TABLE XVI 
CHI-SQUARE VALUES FOR INTERVIEW 
EVALUATION DATA 
Information Information 
Variable v (High Constraint) (Low Constraint) v Constraint 
Tendency to 
Resolve 
Information 
Support 
Time Span 
Geographical 
Perspective 
**P <. 01 
4 56. 7385*~'( 
4 66.4710** 
4 20. 8128*~"' 
6 14.445** 
88.0844** 2 4.4622 
68. 9728*'>'( 2 3.8881 
47.2353** 2 23. 9225'>'(* 
112.0956** 3 20.3451*'k 
Differences in the number of probes and requests for information 
occurring during the interview were analyzed using a 3 x 2 weighted 
means analysis. The number of probes failed to significantly differ 
either as a function of information (F = 1.9753, p)-.05) or constraint 
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(F = .0639, p> .05) and the interaction term was not significant 
(F = 3.0893). By contrast, high constraint subjects manifested 
significantly fewer r~ques;ts for information as compared to low constraint 
subjects (F = 6.2250, p<.Ol), while the F ratios for information 
level (F = .6237, p,,>.05) and interaction (F = .4456, p.).;OS) were 
not significant. 
Upon completion of the-abQVe·analyses an additional test of 
major hypotheses was performed. It was initially intended to measure 
attitude-change solely by the total degree of change in·response to 
the social issues questionnaire. At this point it was realized 
that a less subtle, but perhaps more important·index of the 
differential responses of the experimental groups to the inconsistency 
confrontation was contained in pre~post reversals on the social issues 
questionnaire items. A reversal was defined as a shift from, for 
example, one of the three favor or like categories to one of the 
oppose or dislike positions (or vice versa) on either the evaluation 
of Nixon or any of the four issues. Hence a reversal can be best 
' 
conceived as a total reorientation of the subject's attitude toward 
the referent in question, as opposed to the relatively minute 
changes reflected in the inconsistency scores. Table XVII represents 
'· the percentage of subjects· who reversed one or more responses to 
the social issues ques.tionnaire items for each group, while Table 
XVIII shows the Chi-square totals for the information and constraint 
comparisons. As Table XVIII indicates, the percentage of subjects 
who changed one of their responses to a diametrically different 
position was significantly greater among low as compared to high 
constraint subjects, while significant differences were not observed 
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among levels of information. Thus, information would appear to be 
most closely related to quantitative attituqe changes in response 
to the confrontation, while the constraint variable is a better 
predictor of qualitative changes. 
TABLE XVII 
PERCENT OF REVERSALS BY INFORMATION 
AND CONSTBAINT GROUPS 
% Reversals on % Reversals on 
Information Constraint Nixon Item Issue Items 
H H 10.90 9.09 
H L· 18.51 14.82 
M H 10.71 10. 71 
M L 16.92 16.92 
L H 9.09 9.09 
L L 28.88 17.78 
H 13.21 10.98 
M 13.97 15.05 
L 16.66 14.10 
H 9.48 9.48 
L 21.16 16·. 79 
TABLE XVIII 
CHI-SQUARE VALUES FOR FREQUENCY 
OF REVERSALS 
Information 
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Variable v High Constraint Low Constraint v Constraint 
Reversals 
(Nixon) 
Reversals 
(Issues) 
*p~ • 05 
**P< .01 
2 
2 
.31 .24 1 
. 06 .30 1 
Summary data concerning reported political identification, 
involvement, and the use of various news media is presented in 
Table XIX. Table XX indicates the Chi-square values for these 
6.44** 
5.78* 
variables. As predicted, high information and constraint groups 
reported greater participation in political affairs than did low 
information and constraint groups. Also consistent with expectation 
subjects possessing higher levels of information and constraint 
differed significantly from the lower groups in terms of media 
usage, with the former relying more heavily on established news 
media, especially newspapers and magazines, while the latter groups 
reported relatively less influence from printed and broadcast media 
and relatively greater reliance on personal and face-to=face sources 
of news and opinion (e.g. parents, family and friends). As predicted, 
the results indicated that higher levels of information were 
associated with a greater percentage of reported registration and 
Grou:e Parti ID 
I c %D %R %1 
H H 60.00 34.54 5.45 
H L 33.33 40. 74 25.92 
M H 35. 71 64.28 o.oo 
M L 24.61 56.92 18.46 
L H 54.54 24.24 21.21 
L L 35.55 31.11 33.32 
H 
-
51.21 36.58 12.19 
M 
-
27.95 59.13 12.90 
L 
-
43.58 28.20 29.20 
-
H 52.58 38.79 8.62 
-
L 29.92 45.25 24.80 
TABLE XIX 
POLITICAL IDENTIFICATION, INVOLVEMENT, 
AND MEDIA USAGE BY INFORMATION 
AND CONSTRAINT GROUPS 
- - - - - - -~ -- - -----
Political Involvement Media Usa~e 
%Reg %Voted %Part x Print x Broad x Parents 
. 
96.36 87.27 56.36 59.89 33.93 1.45 
70.37 70.37 33.33 40.15 49.48 o.oo 
100.00 89.28 25.00 30. 71 57.50 0.00 
90.76 87.69 27.69 44. 75 32.22 11.09 
57.57 57.57 42.42 35.36 41.97 4.85 
71.11 71.11 17. 77 27.56 42.89 7.56 
87.80 81. 70 48. 78 . 53.59 39.05 0.98 
' 
93.54 88.17 26. 88 · 40.53 39.83 7.75 
65.38 65.38 28.20 30.86 42.50 6.41 
82.75 79.31 44.82- 45.87 41.90 2.07 
80.29 78.83 25.54 38.20 39.12 7.74 
x Other 
4.54 
10.37 
11. 79 
12.22 
17.82 
22.00 
6.62 
12.09 
20.23 
10.07 
15.07 
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voting. Surprisingly, however, constraint was not related to these 
variables. Also, differences in the distribution of political 
affiliation across information and constraint groups were unexQected 
and conflict with earlier findings reported by Rambo, Jones, and 
Finney (1973). 
TABLE XX 
CHI-SQUARE VALUES FOR POLITICAL 
IDENTIFICATION, INVOLVEMENT, 
AND MEDIA USAGE 
Information 
Variable v High Constraint Low Constraint v Constraint 
Registration 
Voting 
Participation 
Party Identi-
fication 
Media Usage 
*P {. 05 
**p (. 01 
2 32.93** 
2 13.35** 
2 7.48* 
4 17.98** 
6 32.79** 
8.59 1 1.56 
5.83 1 .01 
2.35 1 10.36** 
7.64 2 18.09** 
23.95 3 8.25* 
One additional variable was of interest. The mean information 
and constraint scores for male subjects were 67.54 and 47.66 respec= 
tively, while the female subjects had an average information score 
of 56.28 and a constraint mean of 45.33. The difference for 
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information groups was significant (t = 3.19, p~.01) as predicted. 
However, conflicting with previous reports, male-and female subjects 
did not differ in constraint (t =Q.79, p.>.05). 
Study No~_ 2 
The purpose of the second study was to-examine whether constraint 
and information were related to measurable properties of personality 
and various aspects of political decision making. To accomplish 
this, independent variable groups were again constructed by dividing 
the observed information distribution· into approximately equal thirds, 
while the·· constraint continuum was split at the middle of all 
possible scores. Table XXI presents the range and means of each 
group for information and constraint as well as for·each level of the 
independent variables.r It has been previously demonstrated that 
. ·' 
this procedure adequately separates subjects into discernably 
different groups relative to the independent variables, thus tests 
of significance among the six groups were not necessary. However, 
differences in constraint as a function of information were of 
interest as possible further confirmation of the non-monotonic 
relationship reported by Jones and Rambo. Rigure 7 indicates that 
a U-shaped function again characterizes the relation between the two 
variables, providing the.·second replication of this finding. Again, 
the differences were significant (F = 6.34, p < .01). 
Personality differences associated with differential amounts 
of information and constraint were tested using 3 x 2 (information 
x constraint) analyses of variance. Table XXII represents raw score 
means for the six scales of the Conceptual Systems Test,.and Table XXIII 
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contains F ratios for these variables. As Table XXIII indicates, 
information level was significantly related to the extent of divine 
fate control, with high information subjects manifesting less 
religious concern. High constraint subjects yielded significantly 
greater indexes measuring the needs for people and to help people, 
while also showing lower interpersonal aggression and anomie scores. 
Significant interactions were obtained for the interpersonal 
aggression and need for people scales. Thus distinct personality 
differences were observed primarily in conjunction with levels of 
constraint, with high constraint subjects indicating what might be 
called more.adaptive or socially acceptable dispositional 
characteristics. 
In addition to personality differences four self-reported 
aspects of political decision making were assessed in the second 
study. Table XXIV presents the proportions for these,variables 
by independent variable groups. For the time of candidate selection, 
importance of voting and attitude change indexes the 5 point scales 
originally used (see Appendix C) were combined into three categories 
to facilitate the. analysis. Table XXV contains Chi-square totals 
for these variables. In each case the hypothesis was confirmed in 
that high constraint subjects manifested more straight ticket 
voting, perceived the importance of their vote to be greater, 
decided on a Presidential choice earlier, and reported greater 
attitude change than did low constraint subjects. Higher information 
levels were related to earlier candidate choice decisions and 
greater perceived importance of voting, although these results 
were confined to low constraint subjects. 
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TABLE XXI 
EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS CONSTRUCTED FROM 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE CATEGORIES: 
STUDY 412 
Grou2 Information Constraint 
Information Constraint n Range ·Mean .Range Mean 
H H 13 72-90 80.31 47-82 63.38 
H L 15 72-92 79.00 27-42 35.20 
M H 7 . 48-66 54 .86 48-55 51.86 
M L 20 48-64 57.00 20-44 33.50 
L H 12 20-40 31.50 45-60 57.00 
L L 17 20-44 32.00 31-43 36.59 
H 28 72-92 79.93 27-82 48.29 
M 27 48-66 56.44 20-48 38.26 
L 29 20-44 31.79 31-69 45.03 
H 32 20-90 56.44 45-82 58.47 
L 52 20-92 55.35 20-44 35.00 
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Figure 7. Mean Constraint as a Function of Information 
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TABLE XXII 
MEAN PERSONALITY VARIABLE SCORES BY INFORMATION 
AND CONSTRAINT GROUPS* 
GrouE Variable 
Information Constraint DFC NHP IA NS-0 NFP AN 
H H 23.54 34.08 8.92 33.54 39.00 17.38 
H L 26.20 27.93 10.60 34.13 36.27 16.93 
M H 34.29 32.56 11.29 34.00 44.14 15.14 
M L 30.40 27.35 10.45 35.60 32.70 18.40 
L H 33.08 32.08 8.17 35.08 39.08 16.00 
L L 34.24 29.53 11.88 37.35 43.06 19.76 
H 24.96 30.79 9.82 33.86 37.54 17 .14 
M 31.41 28.70 10.67 35 •. 18 35.67 17.56 
L 33.76 30. 59· 10.34 36.14 41.41 18.21 
H 29.47 33.00 9.16 34.22 40.16 16.38 
L 30.44 28.23 10.96 35.75 37.12 18.42 
*(DFC, Divine fate control; NHP, Need to help people; IA, Inter-
personal aggression; NS-0, Need for structure-order; NFP, Need for 
people; AN, Anomie). 
TABLE XXIII 
SUMMARY OF.Fs ASSOCIATED WITH CONCEPTUAL 
SYSTEMS TEST VARIABLES 
Variable 
Divine fate-control 
Need to help people 
\. 
Interpers,onai aggression 
Need for structure-order 
Need for people 
Anomie 
*P <.. 05 
**P <..01 
Information Co-nstraint 
15.20** o.oo· 
0.36 18.94** 
1.36 7.05* 
0.99 .l.14 
2.35 6.28* 
0.66 7.53** 
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·--·- ··---· .. 
Interaction 
1.99 
·1. 02 
5.29** 
0.12 
·10.82** 
2. 77 
%Straight 
Ticket 
I c Voting 
H H 90.90 
H L 69.23 
M H 80.00 
M L 47.35 
L H 85.00 
L L 53.33 
H 
-
66.67 
M 
-
54.17 
L 
-
52.17 
-
H 66.67 
-
L 53.19 
TABLE XXIV 
POLITICAL DECISION VARIABLES BY 
INFORMATION AND CONSTRAINT 
GROUPS 
Time of Decision .. . . Im:2.ortance.of_ Vote .. 
%Early 7J1iddle %Late %Not Impt. Wc~ome Impt. %Very Impt. 
,. 
81.82 18.18 0.00 0.00 15.38 84.62 
23.08 61.54 15.38 13.33 53.85 46.15 
60.00 40.00 0.00 0.00 28.57 71.43 
5.26 31.58 84.21 50.00 30.00 20.00 
25.00 62.50 12.50 8.33 25.00 66.67 
33.33 20.00 46.67 76.47 0.00 23.53 
50.00 41.67 8.33 7.14 32.14 60. 71 
16.67 33.33 66.67 37. 04 29.63 33.33 
30.43 34.78 34.78 48.28 10.32 41.38 
58.33 37.50 4.17 3.12 21.88 75.00 
19.15 36.17 53.19 48.08 25.00 26.92 
Attitude Change 
%Little %Some 7J1uch 
7.69 53.85 38.46 
66.67 13.33 20.00 
14.29 14.29 71.43 
70.00 15.00 15.00 
25.00 8.33 66.67 
64. 71 23.53 11. 76 
39.29 32.14 28.57 
·,:,3_· 56- 14.81 29.63 
48.28 17.24 34.48 
15.62 28.12 56.25 
67 .31 17.31 15.38 
00 
-..J 
Variable 
Straight Ticket 
Time of Decision 
Importance of 
Voting 
Attitude Change 
**P < .01 
TABLE XXV 
CHI-SQUARE TOTALS FOR POLITICAL 
DECISION VARIABLES 
v High Constraint Low Constraint v 
2 .89 1.53 1 
4 7.00 13.88** 2 
4 2.40 15.28** 2 
4 7.66 .97 2 
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Constraint 
5.46** 
18.36** 
23.14** 
24.45** 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
The two studies resulted in what might be called mixed findings. 
Despite the failure.to confirm all hypotheses however, a number of 
general conclusions may be drawn. For the purpose of clarity the 
results will be reorganized into the following two discQssions: 
(1) the effects of the inconsistency confrontation; (2) the -effects 
of information and constraint. 
The Effects of the Inconsistency 
Confrontation 
First, the general thesis that a tendency toward the-resolution 
of attitude inconsistencies would reflect individual differences 
among subjects was supported, All independent variable groups 
attempted more resolutions of the inconsistencies than denials 
during the interview, although there was a significant tendency 
for the lower information subjects to manifest unsupported denials 
in greater frequency. For the high information subjects these 
resolutions appeared to represent compliance behavior (i.e. temporary, 
socially induced, adherence to a norm, in this case the norm of 
consistency communicated by the experimenter). Paradoxically, the 
relatively greater resistance to the interview manipulation of the 
middle and low information subjects was associated with significant 
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attitude changes suggesting eventual conior~ity (i.e. assimilation 
of the consistency communication). 
This result appeared to derive from the differential cognitive 
90 
abilities implied by the different levels of informatio~. For example, 
the experimenter's subjective impression of the high·information 
subjects during the interview was that they employed their superior 
knowledge to bring both more factual information and reasoned opinion 
to bear on the question, and in many cases, to respond to the 
inconsistency by explaining it away. For some this was achieved 
by noting the superficial nature of the proposed inconsistencies 
and by arguing that one's political philosophy need not be consistent 
relative to each and every mundane·comparison·of·specific beliefs 
or by suggesting that the complexity of political affairs 
necessarily renders many political judgments inconsistent duerto 
,' 
rapid changes in political and social realities. Other high 
information subjects attributed the inconsistency to Mr. Nixon 
himself by documenting ideological discrepancies between Mr. Nixon's 
foreign and domestic policies. By contrast, middle·and low 
information subjects more frequently resolved or denied the 
inconsistency by appealing to 'Vague, ill-defined, and sometimes 
defensive absolutisms, e.g. "That's just the way things are .• 
I don't think the President really believes that .•. etc." The 
realtive inability of these subjects to defend with fact and 
opinion their initial SIQ responses appeared to make them more 
vulnerable to subsequent changes in attitudes. 
It may be that the second administration of the SIQ represented 
the·response of each subject to their "performance" during the 
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interview. Perhaps the high information subjects recognized the 
logic and persuasibility of their own arguments and thereby resisted 
any attitude reorganization, while middle and low information 
subjects became painfully aware of their lack of information and 
cognitive skills. Thus, the interview might have served as a 
rehearsal of each subject's attitudes to which they later responded 
according to their ability to articulate adequate explanations for 
their beliefs. 
In this connection, McGuire (1964) has proposed a.theory of 
resistance to persuasion derived from an analogy to biological 
resistance to disease. Innoculation theory, as it is called, 
suggests that subjects can more easily resist attempted attitude 
manipulation if an attack on their beliefs is preceded by refuted 
counterattitudinal arguments. Basically this involves presenting 
the subject with "watered-down" versions of the subsequent attacking 
communication accompanied by persuasive and logical refutations of 
these arguments. According to the theory, this form of counter-
attitude innoculation is effective because it provides the subject 
motivation to defend the beliefs in question and practice at doing 
so. It is argued that such motivation and practice are especially 
crucial in the defense of attitudes which are·rarely challenged 
(e.g. cultural truisms). 
The importance of innoculation theory in this context stems 
from the fact that the level of information would be expected to 
vary directly in relation to exposure to alternative points of 
view and dissonant arguments. Thus the high information subjects 
subjectively appear1ed undisturbed by the inconsistency confrontation 
perhaps because they had previously considered such interpretations 
and had arrived at their respective attitudes in light of 
contrl!dictoriy evidence and arguments. Indeed, the ease with which 
high information subjects resolved the inconsistencies during the 
interview (despite their subsequent SIQ responses) suggests previous 
exposure and hence familarity with contradictory fact and opinion. 
The fact that the resolutions of these subjects were largely judged 
to be·supported, reinforces this contention. Thus, when confronted 
by the experimenter with pressures to comply to the implicit 
manipulation (i.e. to make the two discrepant attitudes consistent) 
these subjects experienced little or no difficulty in doing so and 
when the pressure was removed, they simply returned to their 
earlier evaluations. By contrast, the middle and low information 
subjects attempted more frequently to maintain their attitude 
positions in the interview despite the presence of the experimenter 
and the presumably strong pressure for compliance. If, as is 
being assumed, the middle and low information subjects had 
experienced few previous attacks on their attitudes the interview 
served not only to challenge these beliefs, but also as a 
laboratory to test the adequacy of each subject's defense. Since, 
as the information scores suggest, the middle and especially the 
·low information subjects are typified by the avoidance of dissonant 
fact and opinion then the attitudes of these subjects would be 
analogous to McGuire's cultural truisms, i.e. beliefs that are 
acutely vulnerable to change because they are never questioned 
nor bolstered by reasoned consideration of available information. 
92 
The relationship between constraint and attitude change was 
not established with certainty. However, the pattern of greater 
attitude change among low as compared to high constraint subjects 
was sufficiently consistent so as to raise some doubt concerning 
the applicability of the statistical analysis which was performed. 
In any event, constr~int was found to be·related to what might be 
called substantial attitude change as exemplified by reversals on 
the SIQ, i.e. the level of constraint was significantly associated 
with attitude changes in which the subject manifested a complete 
"about face" in their orientation toward either Nixon or the 
issue. Although the percentage was small for all groups, 
approximately twice as many low as compared to high constraint 
subjects responded with reversals while the level of information 
was not related to the reversal index. 
As noted previously, it could be argued that reversals 
represent a more meaningful example of attitude reorganization than 
the pre-post inconsistency scores per se, in that the former 
suggests a qualitative change (e.g. from like to dislike) while 
the latter might possibly indicate little more than momentary and 
minute qualitative differences. Several authors (e.g. Secord and 
Backman, 1964) have suggested that the frequent failure of survey 
studies to confirm laboratory findings derives from differential 
interest values of the attitude referents involved, i.e. the 
"artificiality" of the controlled experiment vs. the fact that 
field surveys typically investigate ''real" attitudes which are not 
easily altered. It is assumed that the use of actual political 
figures and issues increased the ego-involvement of the present 
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task and hence it is not likely that reversals constitute 
laboratory artifacts. Thus, it may be the case that the reversals 
denoted a magnitude of attitude reorganization similar to that 
evidenced in the non-laboratory setting. Such reorganization would 
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be expected to lead to actual differences in behaviors of considerable 
consequence, e.g. voting. If this interpretation is correct, then 
the results of the principle study would seem to suggest that 
"meaningful" attitude reorganization is difficult to produce in 
the laboratory, but with the minority of subjects for which change 
occurs, it is associated with the level of constraint. 
The difference in resistance or susceptibility to the attempted 
attitude manipulation for the two groups stems from the respective 
consequences of attitude change. For high constraint subjects an 
alteration in one attitude would most likely result in subsequent 
changes in other attitudes. Since massive attitude reorganization 
can be assumed to be discomforting, then the high constraint 
individual possesses greater motivation to avoid the disorientation 
and dissqlutionment which would be expected to accompany such 
change. By contrast, the compartmentalization of the low 
constraint subject makes possible independent and isolated changes 
without requiring alterations in other evaluations. As suggested 
earlier, this does not imply that the low constraint individual 
lacks affective attitudes. Instead, since evaluations are only 
loosely connected in the nonconstrained belief system, then 
complex readjustments are not required. 
By the same token, the lack of relatedness between attitude 
elements renders the low constraint person more vulnerable to 
change. Even assuming that the particular attitude under attack 
is of major importance it must stand, in effect, by itself 
without support from related attitudes and beliefs. The high 
constraint person, by contrast, more likely possesses an intricate 
set of attitudes in which one serves to validate another, which 
is commensurate with a third attitude, and so on. 
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It is interesting to note that high constraint subjects report 
significantly more attitude change of recent origin. One 
interpretation of this finding is that high constraint subjects 
more frequently experience shifts of their attitudes. However, \f 
may also be viewed as confirmation of the above arguments. The 
high constraint person is perhaps better able to detect attitude 
changes when they occur because the structural cohesion of their 
beliefs make such changes salient, i.e. a constrained ideology 
serves as a stable background against which cognitive changes are 
interpreted. In all probability, the low constraint individual 
simply is not aware of the changes that do occur, since there ·is 
little or no basis for comparison. 
Therefore, while not impervious to change, individuals 
characterized by constrained systems of attitudes are less 
vulnerable to attitude manipulation for at least the following 
three reasons: (1) the consequences of change are more severe 
in terms of the total system; (2) single elements are bolstered 
by related attitudes; and (3) there exists a framework in which 
changes are more readily perceived. 
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The Effects of Information and Constraint 
The two studies succeeded in extending the conceptual framework 
for evaluating political ideologies by examining.several variables 
related to information and constraint. The results very strongly 
implied that higher levels of both information and constraint were 
associated with greater commitment to political affairs. Commitment 
in this context is used to connote not only behavioral manifestations 
of involvement (e.g. political participation), but·also, the 
tendency to perceive politics as an appropriate and effective 
arena for social change as well as allegiance to particular 
candidates, political parties, or ideologies. 
Several aspects of the data supported this conclusion. For 
example, the rate of participation in campaigning, fund raising, 
and other forms of volunteer political activity was almost twice 
as great for subjects among the higher levels of information and 
constraint when compared to the rem&ining subjects •. It is not 
surprising that political participation should increase as a function 
of information in that knowledge of politics would seem to be 
both a prerequisite for and a consequence of involvement. 
Similarily, the association between lack·of participation and lack 
of knowledge is a plausible· relationship.· as either· apathy or 
defensiveness could determine both patterns simultaneously. The 
lack of political involvement among low constraint subjects 
probably stems from the ambivalence inherent in the designation. 
Such subjects would lack motivation to actively support a particular 
candidate or party because their attitudes are inconsistent and 
contradictory, lacking the structure necessary for decisive action. 
By contrast, high constraint subjects have anordered perception 
of political events and it is quite likely that part of such a 
structure consists of prescriptions for action. Therefore, since 
the high constraint subject is consistently liberal or conservative 
he is more likely to support a candidate or party representing these 
sentiments than the low constraint subject who is torn between 
conflicting views and shifting loyalties. When the two variables 
were at a maximum (i.e. the high constraintwhigh information group) 
the level of participation is quite high (56%) despite the fact that 
the subjects were college students who would not ordinarily be 
expected to be extensively involved in political affairs. Thus 
the contention that information and constraint facilitate active 
political involvement was well supported by the data. It is 
important to note that the tendency for high constraint subjects to 
be politically active and involved constitutes a replication of \ . 
earlier findings (even though different methods were used) and 
hence appears to be a stable relationship. 
Also supporting the commitment interpretation was the pattern 
of usage of various sources of information and opinion. Generally, 
high information and constraint subjects reported greater influence 
from established sources of news such as radio, television, 
newspapers, news magazines, and books than did their low constraint 
and lower information counterparts. It should be recognized that 
the low information and low constraint subjects also reported 
greatest reliance on such printed and broadcast media, but that 
the basic difference was derived from their relatively greater use 
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of parents, family, and friends as informal sources of information 
and opinion, It follows that attention to established and formal 
sources of news would lead to more thorough knowledge of politics 
and increase the probability that beliefs would be organized into 
an ideological whole. It also seems reasonable to assume that 
such information gathering is indicative of a greater commitment 
to the ideal of an informed electorate who makes reasoned political 
decisions. Reliance upon family and friends would seem to suggest 
either a lack of concern, since such sources could not be expected 
to provide a variety nor depth of information about current events, 
or again defensiveness, in that such sources might be expected to 
more likely agree with one's preconceived attitudes. 
The results also indicated that higher levels of constraint 
and information were associated with the tendency to perceive one's 
vote as more important (although for information this effect was 
confined to low constraint subjects). More precisely, high 
information and constraint subjects tended to feel that their 
vote made a difference in the outcome of an election. By contrast, 
low constraint as well as middle and low information subjects 
seemed to believe that a single vote (their own) carried little 
impact on election results. These results would seem to suggest 
that the former groups were affirming some sort of basic trust in 
the electoral system; i. e. again manifesting a belief in the ideals 
of a citizenship and the responsible electorate which exercises 
control and makes its desires known through the electoral process. 
Further extrapolation from these results suggests that low constraint 
and information subjects are significantly more pessimistic, cynical 
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and/or apathetic about the extent of their own political power. Such 
attitudes imply a basic distrust of the "system" and perhaps a 
rejection of the democratic model as a vehicle for social change. 
Whether the lack of information and constraint produce distrust 
and apathy or such suspicions lead to a lack of constraint and an 
avoidance of information is of course a matter of conjecture. 
Further confirmation of the commitment hypothesis is found in 
the results indicating the period of time during which subjects 
reported deciding how to vote in the 1972 Presidential race. 
Basically, high constraint and information were associated with 
earlier presidential choice decisions, although again the effect 
for information was restricted to low constraint subjects. The 
commitment dimension in this instance is to be found in terms of 
loyalty or commitment to a particular candidate or ideology. Using 
the high constraint-high information group as a model, it is easy 
to surmise the factors influencing early presidential candidate 
selections: (1) Such subjects were characterized by a systematic 
ideology which suggests a logical candidate for support; (2) they 
were better informed relative to the candidates and the issues, and 
thus in a better position to make selections commensurate with 
their attitudes; (3) and many had already been involved in 
campaigning, thereby manifesting behavioral commitments to a 
particular candidate or party. Low constraint-low information 
subjects, of course, would postpone selections for the opposite 
reasons; i.e. they were ambivalent, ill-informed, and uninvolved. 
With the above results, the level of commitment was found to 
increase with simultaneously increasing levels of information and 
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constraint. Three additional aspects of commitment were found to 
vary as a function of either informationor constraint considered 
separately. As hypothesized, high constraint subjects reported 
significantly more straight ticket voting than did low constraint 
subjects, while an effect for information was not observed. The 
commitment implications of straight vs. split ticket voting derive 
directly from the definitional nature of constraint. High constraint 
subjects are committed to what more closely represents a unified 
ideology. If the slate of candidates nominated by a particular 
political party represents the basic.orientation of that ideology, 
then, not surprisingly, the high constraint subject voted for the 
entire· slate while the ambivalence of the low constraint subject 
yielded cross-party selections. By contrast, conventional wisdom 
traditionally assumes that straight ticket voting is a pattern 
based on a poorly informed and apathetic electorate which acts on 
its loyalty to one party without knowing the candidates nor the 
issues involved, while split ticket voting is supposedly more 
indicative of an enlightened approach. The latter assumption 
includes the notion that voting for "the man and not the party" 
derives from a thorough consideration of each candidate, an 
examination of the issues, etc. In light of the present study, 
it is quite likely that this general conceptualization is in error 
because it is an oversimplification and because it confuses the 
effects of political knowledge and ideology. 
Thus, it may be concluded that the straight ticket voter is 
simply more ideological, regardless of the level of awareness of 
politics and the effort expended in making political decisions. 
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Moreover, it is interesting to note that, while not significant, 
the results did indicate an increasing percentage of straight ticket 
voting in conjunction with increasing levels of information. 
Finally, significantly higher rates of voter registration and 
voting itself were observed among high information subjects (although 
for voting the effect for information was confined to high constraint 
subjects). In this instance, the results suggested a greater 
commitment to even the "mechanical" duties of citizenship as a 
function of information, while, consistent with expectations, a 
difference between constraint groups was not found. 
In sum, the pattern of results clearly indicated that the 
prominent consequence of the various levels of information and 
constraint was the degree to which the subject reported involvement 
in or commitment to some aspect of political activity. Closer 
inspection yields a refinement of uhis conclusion. It is possible 
to classify the seven variables discussed above according to the 
extent to which they imply commitment to some specific or partisan 
element of political life as opposed to commitment to the political 
process itself. For example, the time of decision and straight 
ticket voting indexes indicate sup.p.o.rt or lack of it for a particular 
candidate, political party, issue or program. By contrast, the 
perceived importance of one's vote and the media usage variables 
more clearly suggest adherence to or rejection of an abstract 
conceptualization concerning the validity of the democratic process 
based on an actively informed and reasoned electorate. The three 
remaining variables (rate of registration, rate of voting, and 
participation) could conceivably be representative of either loyalty 
to specific candidates and parties, or a belief in the abstract 
ideals of participatory democracy. 
By combining the results discussed so far it is possible to 
generate a theoretical model depicting the relationship between 
various combinations of information.and constraint and the degree 
and type of political commitment associated with them. Figure 8 
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is based on the obtained data and an expansion of the model 
originally proposed by Jones and Rambo (1973). The basic implication 
portrayed in Figure 8 is that while commitment increases as a 
function of increasing levels of both information and constraint, 
the type of commitment associated with each is different. The 
model suggests that constraint considered alone determines commitment 
to specific elements of political affairs (e.g. a candidate or point 
of view) without a general involvement in the political process 
itself as reflected in the high percentage of straight ticket 
voting and the relatively low rates of registration and voting for 
the low information-high constraint subjects. On the other hand, 
information by itself apparently leads to involvement in the 
activities and institutions of political life without creating strong 
and consistent loyalties to particular ideologies, candidates, or 
issues. For example, the high information-low constraint group 
showed high rates of registration and voting, with a low straight 
ticket voting percentage. Only with the high information-high 
constraint group are all of the various manifestations of commitment 
to be found at high levels. Thus, the consequence of informed 
ideology is a genuine political orientation characterized by 
commitment to both general processes and specific elements of 
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politics. The absence of information and constr~int very clearly 
denotes an apolitical person for whom political events have minimal 
salience leading to only casual and sporadic political involvement. 
The model also suggests that moderate' amounts of information in 
conjunction with high or low constraint implies moderate degrees 
of specific or general commitment respectively. Again, the observed 
data basically conforms to this theoretical expectation in that 
the middle information-high constraint group and the middle 
information-low constraint group were located at intermediate points 
along the distributions of the various indexes of commitment.· It 
must, of course, be acknowledged that the subjects in the present 
study were college students and thus these generalizations may not 
hold with other groups differing in age, occupation, education, etc. 
Three types of belief systems were identified in the Jones 
and Rambo (1973) study which may now be expanded due to the 
development of an individual measure of constraint with the resultant 
capacity to measure constraint on an individual subject basis. The 
present study has reinforced the earlier contention that the 
assumed drive for homeostatic balance among attitude elements is 
a characteristic of only some individuals and not a first principle 
of cognitive behavior. Those subjects who manifest high constraint 
among their attitudes have been designated as ideologues because 
the presence of a system of interrelated and consistent political 
evaluations necessarily implies an ongoing, viable, and coherent 
political philosophy. Different types of ideology may occur 
however depending upon the level of information associated with it. 
What has been designated as the cognizant ideologue represents a 
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person who is well informed, logical, and committed to political 
affairs. Such a person·is able to maintain.an ideological 
perspective because they actively seek information and also perhaps 
because they possess the conceptual organizational ability to do so. 
In relation to political events (e.g. debates, campaigns, etc.) 
the cognizant ideologue is flexible and attentive as well as 
perhaps "open-minded" because of the magnitude of specific 
considerations wh~ch can be managed via the orderly thinking imposed 
by an ideology. At the same time, however, the person possessing 
this type of belief system would be expected to be relatively 
resistant to political persuasion in that constraint implies that 
change in one set of attitudes carries a high probability of 
creating change in other parts of the system. This description 
is similar to what other observers·identify as the "true ideologue" 
who is ordinarily conceived of as representing a small segment of 
the American adult population (e.g. Converse, 1964). In this 
connection it is interesting to note that in the two samples studied 
the cognizant ideologue combination also is found in only modest 
proportions (i.e. 22% and 15%). 
With descending levels of information, the type of ideology 
associated with high constraint becomes less cognizant and logically 
based. What has been designated as the intuitive ideologue (i.e. 
high constraint-low information) represents the extreme form of a 
person who possesses ideological consistency which is based on 
external sources. In the .Jones and Rambo study (1973) the 
degree of constraint manifested by these subjects was attributed 
to sources of authority (e.g. parents, school, church, etc.) as 
opposed to experience with or consideration of the issues involved 
in such attitudes. Most likely, these subjects model or learn a 
set of values which specify,rules and opinions which, in turn, 
favor a particular candidate or political party, without supplying 
underlying explanations. The intuitive ideologue, therefore, is 
committed to those aspects of politics which he has been taught 
to support. As opposed to the more cognizant form of ideology, 
this type of person would be expected to be defensive and rigid. 
Information, political discussions, etc., are avoided because 
contradictory fact and opinion threaten the internal structure 
of the system of attitudes in that the system is built on "faith" 
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in the sources of authority, rather than familiarity with the issues. 
The non-ideologue designation refers to those persons who 
fail to show substantial constraint among attitude elements. This 
does not necessarily suggest that such individuals are totally 
lacking political opinions. Instead the non-ideologue is either 
ambivalent or apathetic relative to political affairs. What has 
been called the intuitive non~ideologue does represent a cluster 
of subjects who manifested such meager political information and 
participation scores that it is difficult to draw any conclusion 
other than the notion that politics are of virtually no concern 
to them. In addition to an interpretation of apathy, however, it 
is also possible that such combinations of low constraint, low 
information, and low commitment reflect a general disenchantment 
with political processes. In other words, at least a portion of 
such subjects may be better characterized as possessing feelings 
which actively reject conventional political mechanisms and insti-
tutions, than simply lack of concern. 
The most frequent pattern of ideological inconsistency occurs 
in conjunctid,n with moderate information levels. Jones and Rambo 
(1973) identified this combination as the transitional belief 
system due to the possibility that these subjects were in a 
temporary state of ambivalence and indecision. It was argued 
that what is now called the mixed non-ideologue represents a form 
of cognitive "breakdown" that might be expected to occur as the 
structure of intuitive ideologies deteriorates in the face of 
persuasive facts and opinions. The fact that the subjects in that 
study as well as the present investigation were primarily college 
students who are being exposed to new interpretations of political 
and social events, lends credence to this hypothesis. It is 
assumed that the moderate level.of information. plays a crucial 
role in the determination of this pattern. For example, the 
moderate non-ideologue, unlike the intuitive ideologue, is not 
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able to construct an ideology in the comfort of ignorance where 
disconfirming information is not present to disrupt the links 
between attitude elements. At the same time, however, the moderate 
non-ideologue does not have the abundance of political knowledge 
which could allow for a cognizant ideology, although it is likely 
that continued education and political involvement results in the 
formation of more logically consistent belief systems. What is 
not yet clear is whether or not such a developmental sequence (i.e. 
from intuitive ideologue to moderate non-ideologue to cognizant 
ideologue) is typical of most individuals. While the present 
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studies do not provide the appropriate longitudinal data for 
interpretation, it is possible that the moderate non-ideologue 
position is the most common among the adult electorate. If this is 
the case, then the frequent references to general ideological shifts 
in the "minds of a majority" of Americans are simply inappropriate. 
That is, if the preponderance of the electorate is best characterized 
by the moderate information, non-ideological designation, then the 
outcome of any particular index of public opinion (e.g. elections, 
opinion polls, etc.) is most likely a transitory environmentally 
determined effect. 
The Jones and Rambo model also suggested that a nonmonotonic 
and possibly U-shaped function best describes the relationship 
between information and constraint. That contention was in 
conflict with Converse (1964) and others who have argued that 
constraint varies as a linear function of cognitive sophistication 
(e.g. information) found in the general electorate. For Converse, 
high levels of information is presumed to be found with subjects 
who also manifest considerable internal consistency among beliefs 
with decreasing levels of constraint being associated with 
decreasing levels of information. From the results of the present 
studies, however, it has become increasingly clear that the 
relationship between information and constraint is nonmonotonic. 
This finding has been replicated three times with three 
different subject populations, two different methods for determining 
constraint, and two different information tests and thereby appears 
to be a relatively stable function. 
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Although such results are clearly at variance with those 
reported by Converse and his colleagues, at least two considerations 
temper unqualified acceptance of the U-shaped function. First, as 
with previous studies by the present author, the data was collected 
using college students, primarily from 18 to 21 years of age. It 
may be argued that such subjects should not be expected to accurately 
reflect political behavior processes as found in the general 
electorate due to their youth, their relative inexperience with 
political affairs, and also because of their educational level.with 
all of the attendant attitudinal and intellectual correlates of 
high education. 
The effects of such a restriction on the composition of the 
sample cannot readily be determined without additional research 
involving samples which are more heterogenous as regards age and 
education. It should be noted, however, that the second study did 
include a number of subjects older than is usually the case for 
college students and the nonmonotonic function is obtained. 
Secondly, an examination of the raw data reveals that there is 
a wide variety of constraint scores among low information subjects 
and that the relatively high constraint mean for that group results 
primarily from a minority of subjects who score substantially 
higher than other low information subjects on the constraint test. 
By contrast the constraint scores of the high information subjects 
were more uniformly high, i.e. homogeous. This was true for both 
of the present samples. Hence, it is possible that the present 
results depended, in part, on a biased sampling procedure. 
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The second major trend in the data concerns the tendency. of the 
higher level of constraint to be associated with more socially 
acceptable or adaptive patterns as measured by the Conceptual 
Systems Test. Constraint was found to be related to higher scores 
on the need for people and need to help people scales with signifi-
cantly lower scores for interpersonal aggression and anomie. Taken 
together, these results suggest that high constraint subjects 
are more socially concerned and perhaps more comfortable with 
themselves. Moreover, these results are not inconsistent with the 
model presented above. For example, it is reasonable to conclude 
that one of the resultant effects of ideological cognitive 
organization is a sense of assurance that seemingly complex and 
diverse political events are interpretable. This is not to 
suggest that the ideologue-is pleased with-all that transpires in 
the political arena, but rather, that an.ideology provides the 
tools by which such events may be understood and perhaps predicted. 
This assumption is similar to the underlying principle of 
the balance theories, i.e. that attitude inconsistencies are 
psychologically disturbing. The balance theories, however, conceive 
of such discomfort in a temporal sense where inconsistencies create 
sufficient-motivation for attitude change. In the present context, 
attitud~ inconsistency (i.e. lack of constraint) implies a long 
term cognitive condition analagous to a personality disposition. 
Therefore an habitual state of consistency or inconsistency might 
be expected to lead to relative stable personality differences. 
Thus, since high constraint subjects are more secure and less 
confused relative to their own political identity i.t. is not 
surprising that they are able to reflect a greater need to help 
others, for example. Further non-ideologues might be expected to 
manifest greater anomie, in that they do not possess stable 
attitudinal anchors to guide their behavior. 
It was surprising to find that the political party with which 
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the subjects identified was related to both information and constraint, 
although for information this effect was restricted to high constraint 
subjects. The results indicated that identification with the 
Republican Party were proportionally greater at the middle level 
of information and among the lower constraint group. By contrast, 
Democratic subjects accounted for the majority of both the high and 
low information group as well as the high constraint group. 
Since these results conflict with earlier findings it is 
conceivable that they reflect the transitory influence of 
contemporary political events, i.e. the study was conducted during 
the initial disclosures of the ''Watergate scandals." Accordingly, 
subjects characterized by strong Republican sentiments might be 
expected to yield moderate to low information and constraint scores 
due to an avoidance of distasteful news and the probable confusion 
associated with such distrubing revelations. Subjects identifying 
with the Democratic Party may have found confirmation of previously 
held attitudes in the same events, the effects of which might have 
been to facilitate the organization of such attitudes into a more 
highly constrained ideology. This interpretation does not account, 
however, for the frequency of Democrats among the low information 
group. It is quite likely that poorly informed Democrats represent 
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the best example of the intuitive type of system outlined above. 
An examination of the raw data revealed that these subjects, almost 
exclusively. lower division students, were predominately from Oklahoma. 
Thus it is probable that the high constraint-low information 
combination observed for this group denotes the residue of 
adolescent beliefs developed independent of substanitive information 
in historically Democratic Oklahoma. Such subjects maintain their 
attitudes, not because recent evidence appears to validate those 
attitudes, but rather, because they were always told to believe in 
this or that fashion. 
Interestingly, the highest proportion of subjects who classified 
themselves as Independents were found among the low information and 
low constraint groups suggesting that this category is more 
indicative of a lack of interest in politics than independence of 
political judgment. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
The present investigation sought to clarify the respective 
influence of political information and constraint on attitude 
change, self-reported political behavior, and personality. The 
two studies were preceded by scaling procedures performed to develop 
tests of information level and constraint. The results from the 
two studies suggested that the information scale was the more 
effective of the two measures although numerous differences in 
relation to constraint scores were observed. The difference 
between the two instruments probably derived from the fact that 
information represents a more direct and simple concept, thus it 
is more easily scaled. Also, previous research had demonstrated 
the efficacy of the procedures used to develop the information 
scale, while an individual measure of constraint was attempted 
for the first time. 
One obvious direction for future research is the continued 
validation of the constraint scale. Of particular importance would 
be indications that the scale actually assesses the tendency toward 
logically related attitudes, as opposed to attitude consistency 
simply defined. Comparisons between scores derived from the 
individual measure of constraint and the interview procedures 
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employed by Converse would also be of interest. Finally, a double-
cross validation procedure should be attempted to more firmly 
establish the relationship between the new scale and the method of 
determining average interitem contingency coefficients used in the 
Jones and Rambo {1973) study. More specifically, groups could be 
constructed from individual constraint scores on one form of the 
SAS in order to determine the group mean contingency coefficients 
on the other form. 
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The first study was designed to determine the effects of 
information and constraint on.an experimentally induced attitude 
manipulation. Statistical and experimental design problems prevented 
a definitive test of the hypotheses. Nonetheless, it was found 
that attitude change varied as an.inverse function of information. 
Some support for the hypothesis that attitude change would vary as 
an inverse function of constraint was also observed, especially in 
relation to reversals (i.e. qualitative changes) on specific SIQ 
items. Thus both information and constraint may be conceptualized 
as cognitive dimensions which mediate attitude change phenomena. 
Also substantial stylistic differences were observed in the 
responses of subjects to the inconsistency confrontation. Basically, 
individuals characterized by higher levels of information and 
constraint tended to use broader explanatory principles to defend 
their beliefs. These results, in part, may be taken as confirmation 
of the notion of a "true ideologue" as described by Converse and 
oth,ers, in that the high information-high constraint subjects were 
in fact. aware, articulate, logical, informed, actively involved, 
and self assured. Thus both the results of the interview content 
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variables and the subjective impressions of the experimenter tended 
to validate the information and constraint measures. 
Additional research and replication are required to overcome 
the difficulties in the present investigation. In particular, 
care should be exercised to equate different information and 
constraint groups on initial attitude. Depending on the outcome 
of future attempts to validate the constraint scale, a different 
method of assigning subjects to constraint groups may also be 
advisable. For example, since the constraint scale is apparently 
less discriminating than is desirable, it may be necessary to 
separate constraint groups by eliminating subjects who score at 
the middle of the distribution of constraint values. Alternatively, 
less homogenous populations (i.e. subjects other than college 
students) may yield a more adequate distribution of constraint 
scores. 
It would also be interesting to study the effects of information 
and constraint on attitude change using alternative methods of 
attitude manipulation, e.g. forced compliance, persuasive 
communication, incentive paradigms, etc. It might also be 
advisable to use less robust manipulation procedures that would not 
elicit near universal attitude change in the sample. This might 
be accomplished by delaying the post-test administration for a longer 
period of time. Such a design would also provide for an analysis 
of the extent to which attitude changes in relation to information 
and constraint are persistent or transitory. Additionally, a 
longitudinal design would enable a more definitive assessment of 
the theoretical assumption of interrelatedness among attitudes. That 
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is, the concept of constraint could be futher substantiated if, 
for example, minor attitude changes induced experimentally with high 
information-high constraint subjects lead to more,extensive attitude 
reorganization over time. Similarly, the Jones and Rambo model 
depicting the relationship between,information,and constraint 
predicts that increasing the. level of information for intuitive 
ideologues results in,a reduction of attitude system constraint. 
This and related hypotheses generated by the·U-shaped model warrant 
further examination, 
The present investigation did. provide two additional 
replications of the U-shaped relationship between information and 
constraint reported by Jones and Rambo. As before, however, 
additional studies measuring these variables in differing populations 
(espec\ally older adults and non-college educated subjects) are 
required before generalizations may beconfirmed. 
What perhaps constitutes a unique contribution to the literature 
concerning political behavior was the finding that increases of 
both information.and constraint.apparently lead to increasing 
levels of commitment to political affairs. Furthermore, the 
evidence suggested that constraint was most closely associated 
with commitment to specific entities (i.e. candidates, political 
parties, issues, etc.) of political life, while information, by 
itself, more clearly implies involvement•in the general process 
of politics, e.g. registez::ing, beiag informed, voting, etc. 
The data also offered a tentative hypothesis concerning the 
long term effects on personality of various levels of constraint. 
Generally high constraint was associated with more positive, adaptive, 
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and socially acceptable personality dimensions. On the other hand, 
lower constraint subjects showed a pattern of aggressiveness, 
isolation, apathy, and anomie. Since the methods used in this 
. part of the investigation were exploratory and less than precise 
(e.g. hypotheses were not generated) further work is needed to 
establish the stability of the personality differences associated 
with constraint. 
Finally, the investigation .furthered the development of a 
theoretical model which attempts to explain.political behavior. 
This conceptual framework can be best described by the two types 
of belief systems located at the extremes of the principle axis 
of the model. The cognizant ideologue (high constraint-high 
information) is a person who is characterized by ideological 
consistency, information seeking, political cormnitment, and 
socially adaptive personality traits. By contrast, the intuitive 
non-ideologue (low constraint~low information) person is more 
often inconsistent, uninformed, uninvolved, and characterized by 
negative personality traits. Thus, it is possible that other 
personality dimensions, e.g. self concept, intelligence, internal-
external controls, anxiety, dominance-submission, etc. vary along 
this axis in. a fashion . similar to commitment. An examination of 
such variables and their respective influences on political 
behavior would be of value. 
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APPENDIXES 
George McGovern 
Dislike 
Ronald Reagan 
Dislike 
John Connally 
. 
Dislike 
Hubert Humphrey 
Dislike 
Richard Nixon 
Dislike 
Edward Kennedy 
Dislike 
APPENDIX A 
SOCIAL ISSUES QUESTIONNAIRE 
. 
'. 
Part· I 
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Like 
Like 
Like 
Like 
' . . 
Like 
Like 
Edmund Muskie 
: 
Dislike 
Spiro-Agnew 
Dislike 
George Wallace 
Dislike 
Nelson Rockefeller 
.. 
. . 
Dislike 
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Like 
Like 
Like 
Like 
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Part II 
Legalization of marijuana. 
Oppose Faver 
Granting of amnesty to AWOLS and draft evaders. 
Oppose Favor 
Providing federal aid to private schools. 
Oppase Favor 
Revenue sharing. 
Oppose Favor 
The rationing of gas to conserve energy. 
Oppose Favor 
Implementation of no-fault automobile insurance rather than liability. 
Oppase Favor 
Freezing appropriated funds deemed inflationary by the President. 
Oppose Favor 
Immunity of news reporters from requirements to reveal sources of 
information. 
Gppose Favor 
Economic aid for the rebuilding of North Vietnam. 
Oppose Favor 
Increase in expenditure for medicare. 
Oppose Favor 
Capital punishment for certain crimes. 
Oppose Favor 
Nuclear arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union (SALT), 
Oppose Favor 
Cutting back federal aid to scientific research in areas not 
immediately relevant to the public good. 
Oppose Favor 
Increasing expenditures for national defense. 
Oppose Favor 
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Forceful ousting of the Indians occupying Wounded Knee, South Dakota. 
Oppose Favor 
Increasing use of nuclear power for the generation of electricity. 
Oppose Favor 
Mandatory severe sentences for narcotics peddlers. 
Oppose Favor 
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Military aid to Israel. 
Oppose Favor 
An independent congressional investigation of the Watergate breakin 
and related matters. 
Oppose Favor 
Wage and price controls. 
Oppose Favor 
Publication of secret government documents such as the Pentagon 
Papers. 
Oppose Favor 
The use of import tariffs. 
Oppose Favor 
School busing to achieve racial balance. 
Oppose Favor 
Federal aid to private companies, e.g. railroads, aviation 
manufacturers, etc. 
Oppose Favor 
Resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba. 
Oppose Favor 
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"No knock" laws for law enforcement officers. 
Oppose Favor 
Expansion of the Common Market. 
Oppose Favor 
Mandatory search of airline passengers to prevent skyjacking. 
Oppose Favor 
Economic support for Greece. 
Oppose Favor 
Military intervention should hostilities resume in South Viet Nam. 
Oppose Favor 
Increasing price supports for dairy products. 
Oppose Favor 
Executive privilege of White House officials to not testify before 
congressional committee. 
Oppose Favor 
Increased financial support of the United Nations. 
Oppose Favor 
Relaxation of regulations against pornographic material. 
Oppose Favor 
APPENDIX B 
DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. In your estimation, what was the purpose of the experiment? 
2. Did you feel exploited, pressured or stressed as a result of 
the experiment? Yes No (If yes, please elaborate 
on back.) 
3. Do you feel that your attitudes ch~nged as a result of parti-
cipating in the experiment? Yes No 
4. Do you feel your participation in the experiment and this 
seminar was worthwhile from the standpoint of learning about 
psychology? Yes No 
5. What was your motivation for participating in the experiment? 
6. Would you participate in a similar experiment again without 
receiving extra credit? Yes No 
7. Do you feel the experiment was worthwhile from the standpoint 
of explaining behavior? Yes No 
130 
APPENDIX C 
SELF REPORT QUESTIONNAIRE 
Subject No. Age_ Sex College Class 
Have you registered to vote? 
~------------------~ 
Have you ever voted? 
---
If yes, in what type of election? 
Have you ever participated in political activity? (e.g. campaigning, 
volunteer work for candidates, etc.) Explain. 
Estimate the importance of your vote in determining an election. 
Not important ·· Very important 
To what extent have you experienced a change in your political 
attitudes recently? 
No change : .. . Much Change 
-----------------
Estimate the relative contribution of these sources of news to your 
knowledge of politics and opinions: 
Radio TV Newspapers News Magazines --
Friends Parents Others (specify) 
Did you vote in the 1972 Presidential election? If yes, did 
you vote for either all Democrats or all Republic~i.e. a straight 
party ticket). 
At what time did you make·your decision as to your preferred 
Presidential candidate? before conventions_ during conventions 
between conventions and election day __ in the voting booth 
With which political party (if any) do you most closely identify? 
Republican_ Democrat Independent __ Other (specify) 
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APPENDIX D 
CONSTRAIID ITEM PAIR ANALYSIS 
Form A 
Item Total Mean Discrimination 
Pair .45 .50 .60 .70 .45 Coefficient Total 
1-44 0 1 0 0 1 .3802 24 
2-42 2 1 0 0 3 .4428 ,-36 
3- 6 2 0 0 0 2 .4508 26 ** 
3-19 1 2 0 0 3 .4746 -25 
3-23 1 1 0 0 2 .4398 6 ** 
3-24 0 1 0 0 1 .3752 20 
3-33 1 1 0 0 2 .4390 54 ** 
4- 5 0 1 0 0 1 3955 62 
4- 6 3 1 0 0 4 .4857 20 ** 
4-22 2 0 0 0 2 .4063 26 
4-30 2 0 0 0 2 .3842 54 
4-34 3 0 1 0 4 .4971 18 ** 
4-36 1 2 0 0 3 .4549 56 °1(* 
6 -9 0 1 0 0 1 .3627 38 
6-13 2 0 0 0 2 .3889 62 
6-19 2 0 0 0 2 . 3'800 52 
6-22 0 1 0 0 1 3843 30 
6-23 2 0 0 0 2 4077 34 
6-30 2 0 0 0 2 .4117 36 
6-33 2 0 0 0 2 .4433 6 ~'(* 
6=34 1 1 0 0 2 * 
6-40 3 1 0 0 4 .4813 10 io'( 
6-43 3 1 0 0 4 .4622 - 2 
7-11 0 1 0 0 1 .3564 54 
9-30 0 1 0 0 1 .3726 60 
9-37 1 1 0 0 2 
* 
· 9-44 0 2 0 0 2 .4474 44 ** 
11-16 2 0 0 0 2 .4251 16 ** 
11-19 0 4 0 0 4 .4967 2 -1(* 
11-25 1 1 0 0 2 .4505 50 ** 
11-26 1 2 0 0 3 .4511 112 ir* 
11-28 2 2 0 0 4 .4954 84 ~'(* 
11-31 1 1 0 0 2 .4094 44 
11-33 1 4 0 0 5 .5292 28 ** 
11-34 1 1 0 0 2 .4349 10 ** 
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11-37 1 2 0 0 3 .4965 46 ** 
13-18 1 1 0 0 2 * 
13-19 2 0 0 0 2 .4152 24 
13-25 1 1 0 0 2 .4107 56 
13-26 2 1 0 0 3 .4328 48 *"k 
14-19 1 1 0 0 2 .3757 80 
15-16 2 0 0 0 2 4268 58 ** 
15-25 0 1 0 0 1 .3849 46 
16-17 2 0 0 0 2 .3930 48 
16-19 2 1 0 0 3 .4831 36 ''(* 
16-23 1 1 0 0 2 .4324 56 •k* 
16-26 1 1 0 0 2 .4249 70 ** 
16-32 3 1 0 0 4 .4478 -18 
16-33 2 0 0 0 2 .4379 - 6 
17-19 1 1 0 0 2 * 
17-25 5 0 0 0 5 .4698 -16 
17-37 2 0 0 0 2 * 
18-19 1 1 0 0 2 .4413 38 ** 
19-25 2 0 0 0 2 * 
19-26 1 1 1 0 3 .4805 54 ** 
19-28 2 2 0 0 4 .4960 30 *-I( 
19-29 2 0 0 0 2 .4055 12 
19-30 1 1 0 0 2 .4215 69 ** 
19-31 3 0 0 0 3 .4022 56 ** 
19-32 2 1 0 0 3 .4540 10 "I<* 
19-33 2 3 0 0 5 .5269 4 ** 
19-37 0 1 0 0 1 .4413 44 ** 
19-43 1 1 0 0 2 4293 42 *''( 
21-34 0 1 0 0 1 ** 
21-36 0 1 0 0 1 .3654 86 ** 
22-30 0 1 0 0 1 * 
22-32 3 0 0 0 3 .4556 16 
22-40 0 1 0 0 1 ,'( 
22-43 0 1 0 0 1 .3670 66 ··/("J( 
23-24 0 1 0 0 1 .4005 20 ,'( 
23-26 0 0 1 0 1 .3828 108 
23-28 2 0 0 0 2 .4185 48 
23-32 3 0 0 0 3 .4091 -36 
24-30 3 2 0 0 5 .4893 6 '1(°1( 
24-40 2 0 0 0 2 .4046 6 
25-26 2 0 0 0 2 * 
25-29 0 0 1 0 1 ,'( 
25-33 2 1 0 0 3 .4744 70 ** 
25-34 2 0 0 0 2 ** 25-37 0 1 0 0 1 .4265 44 *"'( 
26-28 1 1 0 0 2 .4668 42 ** 
26-31 0 1 0 0 1 .4310 34 ** 
26-33 1 2 0 0 3 .4774 44 "!ck 
26-34 0 1 1 0 2 .4191 46 
26-39 0 1 0 0 1 .4184 44 
26=42 2 0 0 0 2 .4036 18 
27-37 2 0 0 0 2 * 
28-30 0 1 0 0 1 .4012 32 
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28-31 1 1 0 0 2 .4033 32 
28-33 0 3 2 0 5 .4920 8 ** 
28-34 2 0 0 0 2 .4218 34 ** 
28-37 2 1 0 0 3 .4494 
- 2 
30-34 1 1 0 0 2 .4221 82 ** 
31-34 1 1 0 0 2 * 
31-42 1 1 0 0 2 i( 
32-33 1 1 0 0 2 * 
32-38 2 0 0 0 2 * 
32-43 0 2 0 0 2 * 
33-37 1 2 0 0 3 .4794 28 ** 
33-43 2 1 0 0 3 .4338 - 6 
34-36 0 0 1 0 1 .4354 78 ** 
34-39 1 2 0 0 3 * 
34-42 2 0 0 0 2 * 
34-43 1 1 0 0 2 * 
35-44 0 1 0 0 1 .4151 18 
38-44 0 1 0 0 1 .4111 32 
39-40 2 0 0 0 2 * 
40-43 0 2 0 0 2 .4414 37 ** 
Form L· 
2-13 2 2 0 0 4 .4885 38 ** 
2-14 2 0 0 0 2 .3971 26 
2-16 2 0 0 0 2 .4288 10 
2-18 0 0 0 1 1 .3817 21 
2-19 2 0 0 0 2 .4072 22 
2-20 2 0 0 0 2 .4284 56 
2-21 1 2 0 0 3 .4646 68 ic* 
2-22 2 0 0 0 2 .4015 16 
2-36 2 0 0 0 2 .4194 - 9 
2-38 2 1 0 0 3 .4404 70 "'/(* 
2-43 1 3 0 0 4 .4894 0 
2-44 0 2 0 0 2 4898 48 ** 
3-17 2 0 0 0 2 .3703 26 
3-20 1 1 0 0 2 .4037 96 
3-21 1 1 0 0 2 .4373 22 
3-26 2 0 0 0 2 .4066 36 
3-36 0 0 1 0 1 .3871 -10 
3-37 2 2 0 0 4 .4584 24 *i( 
3-38 0 2 0 0 2 .4015 68 
3-40 1 1 0 0 2 .4366 24 
3-44 2 1 0 0 3 .4553 28 ** 
4-6 2 0 0 0 2 .4001 8 
4-8 2 1 0 0 3 .4330 66 
4-27 3 0 0 0 3 .3947 82 
4-28 2 0 0 0 2 .4354 46 
4-30 2 0 0 0 2 .3883 60 
5-11 1 1 0 0 2 .3802 78 
6-18 1 1 0 0 2 * 
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6-25 1 1 0 0 2 .3898 98 
6-31 2 0 0 0 2 .3982 9 
6-37 1 1 0 0 2 .4353 22 
6-42 2 0 0 0 2 .4297 28 
6-44 2 0 0 0 2 .4049 34 
7-14 3 1 0 0 4 .4692 9 ** 
7-16 1 2 0 0 3 * 
7-29 1 0 0 0 2 .3947 113 
7-43 1 2 0 0 3 .4593 58 ** 
8-21 2 0 0 0 2 .3974 -10 
9-24 1 1 0 0 2 .4118 84 
9-44 1 1 0 0 2 .3865 20 
10-14 0 2 0 0 2 .4504 42 ** 
10-23 1 2 0 0 3 * 
10-25 1 1 0 0 2 .4419 28 ** 
10-29 2 0 0 0 2 .4142/ 22 
10-37 1 1 0 0 2 I .4162 42 
10-38 3 0 0 0 3 .4484 10 
10-43 2 0 0 0 2 .4019 50 
11-27 2 0 0 0 2 .3764 -20 
r2-22 3 0 0 0 3 .4052 110 
12-24 3 0 0 0 3 .3814 75 
13-20 0 3 0 0 3 .4853 30 ** 
13-29 1 1 0 0 2 .4001 71 
13-26 2 0 0 0 2 .3746 41 
13-28 2 1 0 0 3 .4513 '""lfz'i ,, ** 
14-19 2 0 0 0 2 .4226 '72 ** 
14-21 3 0 0 0 3 .4323 32 
14-23 1 1 0 0 2 * 
14-26 1 1 0 0 2 * 
14-38 2 0 0 0 2 .4132 34 
14-44 1 2 0 0 3 .4730 36 ** 
15-16 1 1 0 0 2 * 
15-29 0 2 1 0 3 * 
16-17 2 0 0 0 2 * 
16-23 2 ·o 0 0 2 * 
16-25 2 0 0 0 2 * 
16-27 2 0 0 0 2 * 
16-29 2 0 0 0 2 * 
16-43 0 2 0 0 2 * 
17-21 1 1 ,0 0 2 .4151 53 
17-36 1 2 0 0 3 * 
18-25 1 1 0 0 2 * 
18-36 2 0 0 0 2 * 
19-20 3 1 1 0 5 .5008 34 ** 
19-35 1 1 0 0 2 .4285 36 
19-36 1 1 1 0 3 .4911 32 ** 
19-38 2 0 0 0 2 ,4387 46 
19-41 2 0 0 0. 2 .4031 46 
19-44 2 1 0 0 3 ,,#,~41 8 
20-21 1 2 1 0 4 .5183 34 ** 
20-23 2 1 0 0 3 * 
20-35 2 1 2 0 5 .6068 42 ** 
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20-36 2 0 0 0 2 .4187 24 
20-38 0 0 3 2 5 .6810 - 4 
20-44 0 3 2 0 5 .6056 32 ** 
21-22 0 3 0 0 3 .4989 · 118 
21-24 1 1 0 0 2 .4132 28 
21-25 3 1 0 0 4 .4820 44 ** 
21-26 1 1 0 0 2 .4242 62 
21-27 0 2 0 0 2 .4254 10 
21-33 2 0 0 0 2 .4261 61 
21-34 1 2 0 0 3 .4615 0 
21-35 0 3 0 0 3 .5192 54 ** 
21-36 1 2 0 0 3 .4756 - 5 
21-37 1 2 0 0 3 .4747 48 ** 
21-38 0 2 0 0 2 .4631 64 ** 
21-40 1 2 0 0 3 .4799 32 ** 
21-41 1 2 1 0 3 .4732 28 ** 
21-44 2 2 0 0 5 .5656 69 ** 
22-25 0 2 0 0 2 .4278 46 
22-35 2 0 0 0 2 .3845 51 
22-40 1 1 0 0 2 .4298 . 72 ** 
23-35 2 0 0 0 2 .3845 72 
23-37 2 0 0 0 2 * 
23-38 1 2 0 0- 3 * 
23-43 0 0 1 0 1 * 
23-44 1 1 0 0 2 * 
24-25 0 0 1 0 1 .4205 46 
24-28 0 2 0 0 2 .4516 24 ** 
24-29 1 1 0 0 2 .3901 14 
24-30 2 0 0 0 2 .3907 52 
24-37 0 2 0 0 2 .4235 25 
24-39 1 1 0 0 2 .. 3830 22 
24-40 1 0 1 0 2 .• 4187 58 
24-42 1 1 0 0 2 .4301 10 
25-27 2 0 0 0 2 .4160 28 
25-34 2 1 1 0 4 .5275 22 ** 
25-35 2 1 0 0 3 .4217 60 
25-37 1 3 0 0 4 .4977 52 ** 
25-41 1 1 0 0 2 .4336 -16 
25-44 2 2 0 0 4 .5026 - 6 
26-28 2 0 0 0 2 .4052 74 
26-30 0 0 1 0 1 .3918 71 
26-34 2 1 0 0 3 .4574 8 
26-36 2 1 0 0 3 .4339 6 
27-28 1 2 0 0 3 ·.4695 44 ** 
27-34 0 2 0 0 2 .4355 58 
27-37 1 1 0 0 2 .4196 48 
27-41 0 0 1 0 1 .4279 · 103 ** 
28-29 0 2 0 0 2 .4314 64 
28-33 3 0 0 0 3 .4446 0 
28-34 2 1 0 0 3 .4456 42 ** 
28-36 1 1 0 0 2 .4138 
- 6 
28-39 3 0 0 0 3 .446 -22 
28-40 1 1 0 0 2 .3998 44 
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29-35 2 0 0 0 2 .4070 26 
29-36 2 0 0 0 2 .3909 68 
29-39 1 1 0 0 2 .3866 60 
31-35 2 0 0 0 2 .4037 34 
31-37 2 1 0 0 3 .4509 42 ** 
31-41 1 1 0 0 2 .4257 -26 
31-42 2 2 0 0 4 .4778 22 ** 
32-41 0 2 0 0 2 .4183 100 
33-37 1 1 0 O' 2 * 
34-41 0 2 0 0 2 .4332 26 
35-36 1 2 0 0 3 .4804 34 ** 
35-38 0 3 2 0 5 .5868 42 ** 
35-40 3 0 0 0 3 .4028 38 
35-44 1 2 1 0 4 .5174 36 ** 
36-37 0 1 1 0 2 * 
36-38 1 1 0 0 2 * 
36-44 2 1 0 0 3 .4657 30 ** 
37-40 2 0 0 0 2 * 
37-41 2 2 0 0 4 .5027 26 ** 
37-42 3 1 1 0 5 .5124 22 ** 
37-44 2 1 0 a· 3 .4706 52 ** 
38-44 0 2 3 0 5 .5999 38 ** 
40-41 1 3 0 0 4 .5142 -12 
41-42 0 3 2 0 5 .5764 -28 
43-44 0 5 0 0· 5 .5297 6 ** 
*Pairs excluded due to the failure to meet minimum contingency 
cell requirements. 
**Pairs selected for constraint test. 
APPENDIX E 
INFORMATION SCALE 
1. Which of the following is not a member of the Women's Political 
Caucus? 
a. Gloria Steinem 
b. Shirley Chisholm 
c. Bella Abzug 
d. Be·tty Freidan 
e. All of above are members 
2. The current Vice-President of the U.S. is: 
a. John N. Garner 
b. Hubert H. Humphrey 
c. Richard M. Nixon 
d. Spiro T. Agnew 
e. John Connally 
3. Which of the following is not a power or job of the President? 
a. power to veto 
b. power to levy taxes 
c. appointment of judges 
d, commander-in-chief of armed forces 
e. enforcement of laws 
4. How many members are there-in Congress (house and senate)? 
a. 435 b. 100 c. 535 d. 475 e. 575 
*5. Who is the leader of the Senate-? 
a. Vice-President 
c. Minority Whip 
e. Minority Leader 
b. Majority Whip 
d. Majority Leader 
6. Those theories and political movements espousing "the reconstruction 
of the capitalistic system of a society by democratic and 
parliamentary methods, with the aim of establishing state ownership 
and control of the most fundamental means of production and 
distribution of wealth" describes: 
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a. liberalism b. capitalism 
c. democracy d. communism 
e. socialism 
7. An individual with a conservative political philosophy would be 
most likely to favor which of the following: 
a. men are naturally created equal and therefore society requires 
classlessness for the good of all 
8. 
9. 
b. order, authority, and community are the primary defense 
against the impulse to violence and anarchy 
c. progress is the root of society, tradition is worthless 
d. man is ruled by reason rather than emotion 
e. if something develops over a long period of time it is 
likely to be outmoded and useless 
Who is chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee: 
a. Senator Kennedy b. Senator Stennis 
c. Senator Fulbright d. Senator Javits 
e. Senator Humphrey 
Who is the Senate Minority Leader? 
a. Gerald Ford b. Hugh Scott 
c. William Rogers d. John Connally 
e. John Erlichman 
10. Which of the following confirms presidential appointments? 
a. State Department 
c. Senate 
e. the Cabinet 
b. House of Representatives 
d. Pentagon 
*11. Who is currently the Prime Minister of England? 
12. 
a. Wilson 
c. Trudeau 
e. Heath 
Who is the Israeli 
a. Golda Meir 
c, Abba Eban 
e. Moshe Dayan 
Foreign 
b. Phil by 
d. Brandt 
Minister? 
b. Gandhi 
d. Yigal Allon 
~'<13. Who is the Chairman of the Senate I s Commit tee on Government 
Operations (which is currently conducting an investigation into 
the Watergate incident)? 
a. Mike Mansfield 
c. Hubert Humphrey 
e. Ted Kennedy 
b. Sam Erwin 
d. George McGovern 
*14. What does the A in SEATO stand for? 
a. African b. atomic 
e. none of these 
*15. Who is Chile's President? 
a. Franco 
c. Allende 
e. Peron 
c. alliance 
b. Gonzales 
d. Marcos 
d. American 
16. Who is the governor of California? 
a. Edmund Brown 
c. Joseph Alioto 
e. Pete Mccloskey 
b. Richard Daley 
d. Ronald Reagan 
*17. Which of the following was responsible for the release of the 
Pentagon Papers? 
a. E. Howard Hunt 
c. William Safire 
e. Ronald Ziegler 
b. Jack Anderson 
d. Daniel Ellsberg 
*18. What state is Spiro Agnew from? 
a. North Carolina 
c. Maryland 
e. West Virginia 
b. South Carolina 
d. Virginia 
*19. Which state does George McGovern represent in the Senate? 
a. North Dakota 
c. Nebraska 
e. New York 
b. Massachusetts 
d. South Dakota 
*20. How many justices are there presently on the Supreme Court? 
a. 7 b. 5 c. 12 d. 9 e. 13 
21. James Buckley could be characterized as a: 
a. liberal Democrat 
c. conservative Democrat 
e. liberal Independent 
b. liberal Republican 
d. conservative Republican 
*22. The unfair apportionment of political districts for election 
purposes is called: 
a. boondoggling 
c. feather bedding 
e. gerrymandering 
b. moonlighting 
d. port barreling 
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*23. The Speaker of the House of Representatives is: 
*24. 
*25. 
a. Rep. Boggs b. Rep. Albert 
c. Rep. Waldie d. Rep. McCormick 
e. Rep. Downing 
Which of the following is true: 
a. representatives serve 4-year terms 
b. senators represent the state as a whole, while representatives 
are elected from districts 
c. representatives serve 6-year terms 
d. representatives represent the state as a whole, while 
senators are elected from districts 
e. both sena.tors and representatives are elected from districts 
The term of office for the u. s. Senate is: 
a. 6 years b. 2 years 
c. 4 years d. 8 years 
e. 5 years 
26. The statement ''our society is so complicated that if you try to 
reform parts of it you're likely to upset the entire system" 
expressed the views of which type of ideology: 
27. 
a. liberalism 
c. socialism 
e. communism 
The chairman of 
Committee is: 
a. Rep. Ford 
c . Rep. Byrnes 
e. Rep. Mills 
b. radicalism 
d. conservatism 
the House of Representatives Ways and Means 
b. Rep. Albert 
d. Rep. Stratton 
*28. Which of the following is true: 
a. there is a Republican majority in Congress 
b. the current Democratic majority in Congress is the first 
since the Kennedy Administration 
c. the current Republican majority is the first since the 
Eisenhower Administration 
d. currently there is an equal number of Republicans and 
Democrats in Congress 
e. there is presently a Democratic majority in Congress 
29. George McGovern could be characterized as a: 
a. liberal Republican 
c. conservative Republican 
e. conservative Independent 
b. conservative Democrat 
d. liberal Democrat 
*30. John Connally could be characterized as a: 
a. liberal Democrat 
c. liberal Republican 
e. conservative Democrat 
b. conservative Republican 
d. liberal Independent 
*31. The Bureau of the Budget is part of the: 
a. House of Representatives 
b. Treasury Department 
c. Executive Office of the President 
d. State Department 
e. Interior Department 
*32. The Supreme Court decision which reversed the separate but 
equal policy for school integration was: 
a. McLauren vs. Oklahoma State Board of Regents 
b. Avery vs. Midland, Texas 
c. Brown vs. Topeka, Kansas Board of Education 
d. Plessy vs. Ferguson 
e. Colebrow vs. Green 
33. A political philosophy which advocates a strategy of seizure 
of power by the prolitariat and the establishment of a 
transitional socialist state with state control of industry, 
labor, distribution and credit would best be described as: 
a. Socialist 
c. Conservative 
e. Communist 
b. Liberal 
d. Anarchist 
34. A Writ of Habeas Corpus requires that: 
a. a pre-trial prisoner must be given bail opportunities 
b. a body must be entered as evidence of murder 
c. an individual has to be formally charged for an offense 
in order to be held by authorities 
d. an individual must be advised of his rights when arrested 
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e. an individual cannot be required to testify against himself 
*35. Who is the Prime Minister of Canada? 
a. Heath 
c. Pompidou 
e. Wilson 
b. Trudeau 
d. Udall 
*36. What was the name of the conference held recently between the 
U. S. and USSR to limit nuclear weapons? 
a. SAC b. NATO c. SALT d. ABM e. SEATO 
*37. Who is the President of the Phillipines? 
a. Pompidou 
c. Peron 
e. Allende 
38. Where is Dien Bien Phu? 
a. Korea 
c. Laos 
e. Vietnam 
b. Franco 
d. Marcos 
b. Cambodia 
d. China 
*39. Where did the Bay of Pigs incident occur? 
a. South Vietnam 
c • South Korea 
e. Cuba 
b. North Vietnam 
d. Israel 
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40. Which of the following was recently acquitted of supplying guns in 
the murder of a judge ·in California? 
a. Huey Newton 
c. Elridge Cleaver 
e. Jesse Jackson 
b. Bobby Seale 
d. Angela Davis 
41. Madeline Murray is most closely associated with which of the 
following Supreme Court decisions? 
a •. school desegregation 
c. capital punishment 
e. one man, one vote 
b •. abortion 
d. school prayer 
42. Which of the following is most closely related to political 
liberalism: 
a. property rights b. big business 
c. individual freedoms d. laissez faire capitalism 
e. nationalization of basic industry 
43. Where do appropriation bills originate? 
a. Treasury Department 
c. House of Representatives 
e. Pentagon 
b. President 
d. Senate 
*44. Which of the following is~ true of Shirley Chisholm? 
a. She is a member of the House of Representatives 
b. She is a women's rights advocate 
c. She was a candidate for the Democratic nomination for 
President in 1972 
d. She is a leader of the Women's Political Caucus 
e. All of the above are true 
144 
45. Which of the following was adopted as the most recent amendment 
to the Constitution? 
a. 18-year-old vote 
b. women's rights amendment 
c. legalized abortion 
d. ending prohibition 
e. none of the above 
46. John Lindsay could be characterized as a: 
a. liberal Democrat 
c. conservative Democrat 
e. liberal Independent 
b. liberal Republican 
d. conservative Republican 
*4 7. What does the A in NATO stand for? 
a. armament 
c. American 
e. alliance 
b. Atlantic 
d. atomic 
*48. Which of the following ran against Richard Nixon for the 
Republican nomination in 1972? 
a. Spiro Agnew 
c. Nelson Rockefeller 
e. John Connally 
*49. Who is governor of New York? 
a. John Lindsay 
c. Richard Daly 
e. Nelson Rockefeller 
b. Pete Mccloskey 
d. Ronald Reagon 
b. Edmund Muskie 
d. Ronald Reagon 
50. Who is the Communist party chief in the U.S.S.R.? 
a. Kosygin 
c. Khruschev 
e. Breshnev 
b. Gromyko 
d. Stalin 
*51. Who is the President of Egypt? 
a. Sadat 
c. Hussein 
e. Nassar 
b. Arafat 
d. Meir 
52. Under President Nixon's reorganization of the Cabinet, how many 
"Super-Cabinet" members or Presidential Counselors are there? 
a. 
c. 
e. 
1 
3-•· 
5 
b. 2 
d. 4 
,\-53. The President of South Viet Nam is: 
a. Nguyen Van Thieu b. Ho Chi Minh 
c. Phom Van·Dong d. Chou En-lai 
e. Chui Hui-tso 
54. Which of the following was not a nominee of President Nixon's 
to the Supreme Court in 1972? 
a. Powell 
c. Haynsworth 
e. Carswell 
b. Rehnquist 
d. Black 
55. What is the job of the FTC? 
a. regulation of the communication industry 
b. regulation of business practices and consumer 
c. regulation of the stock market 
d. regulation of prices and wages 
e. regulation of utilities 
protection 
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56. How many states must approve a constitutional amendment for it 
to be adopted? 
a. 34 (2/3 of all states) 
c. 37 (3/4) 
e. none of above 
b. 25 (1/2) 
d. 50 (all) 
57. By what vote must both houses pass a bill in order to override 
a presidential veto? 
a. 1/2 b. 3/4 c. unanimous d. 2/3 e. none of above 
58. How many Senators does each state have? 
a. 1 b. 2 c. 3 d. 4 e. varies by population 
59. How many Representatives does each state have? 
a. 1 b. 2 c. 3 d. 4 e. varies by population 
60. Whose approval is required by the Constitution of all formal 
treaties? 
a. House of Representatives 
c. Senate 
e. the entire Congress 
b. State Department 
d. President only 
61. Who has the power to declare war, according to the Constitution? 
a. House of Representatives 
c. President 
e. only a, b, & c together 
b. Senate 
d. Congress only 
*62. Where was the 1968 Democratic Convention held? 
a. Miami 
c. San Diego 
e. Los Angeles 
b. Chicago 
d. New York 
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*63. Which of the following did not run for the Democratic presiden-
tial nomination in 1972? 
a. McGovern b. Humphrey 
c. Jackson d. Lindsay 
e. Kennedy 
*64. Who is Gloria Steinem? 
a. head of the League of Womens Voters 
b. Women's rights advocate 
c. congresswoman from New York 
d. former Chairwoman of the Democratic National Committee 
e. former Democratic candidate for president 
*65. Which of the following is the former Teamsters president, 
arrested in 1967 for jury tampering and pension-fund fraud? 
a. Mean 
c. Woodcock 
e. Hoffa 
b. Fitzsimmons 
d. Dunlop 
66. Which of the following is not a member of NATO? 
a. Great Britain 
c. West Germany 
e. Belgium 
b. Spain 
d. Netherlands 
67. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is: 
a. Earl Warren 
c. Abe Fortas 
e. William Rehnquist 
b. Warren Burger 
d. Harry Black 
*68. Which of the following fled to Algeria to avoid a return to 
prison? 
a. Huey Newton 
c. Elridge Cleaver 
e. None of the above 
*69. Who is Bella Abzug? 
b. Bobby Seale 
d. Angela Davis 
a. Representative from New York 
b. Senator from New York 
c. President of the League of Womens Voters 
d. Former Chairman of the Democratic National Committee 
e. A candidate for the democratic nomination for president 
*70. Which of the following countries is not a member of the 
International Control Commission supervising the truce in 
Vietnam? 
a. Poland 
c. Indonesia 
e. India 
b. Canada 
d. Hungary 
71. Who is Richard Nixon's advisor for Domestic Affairs? 
a. Earl Butz 
c. William Rogers 
e. John Ehrlichman 
b. Caspar Weinberger 
d. John Connally 
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*72. The Bureau of Indian Affairs is part of which Cabinet Department? 
a. Transportation 
c. Justice 
e. Interior 
b. Health, Education and Welfare 
d. State 
*73. What is the capital of North Vietnam? 
a. Haiphong 
c. Peking 
e. Phnom Pen 
b. Hanoi 
d. Saigon 
74. Who is the Special Security Assistant to President Nixon? 
a. Spiro Agnew 
c. Henry Kissinger 
e. John Connally 
*75. Who is President of France? 
a. DeGaulle 
c. Pinay 
e. Mitterrand 
b. William Rogers 
d. Alexander Haig 
b. Pompidou 
d. Messmer 
76. Who was the chief negotiator for the North Vietnamese in Paris? 
a. Phom Van Dong 
c. Chou En-lai 
e. Le Due Tho 
b, Ho Chi Minh 
d. Nguyen Van Thieu 
77. Who of the following is the Air Force general retired for 
ordering unauthorized bombing raids on North Vietnam? 
a. Ryan 
c. Henderson 
e. Abrams 
b. Herbert 
d. Lavelle 
78. Which of the following was recently defeated in Ireland in an 
election for Prime Minister? 
a. Winchester-Clark 
c, Graig 
e. Lynch 
b. Heath 
d. O'Neil 
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79. Which of the following cities was recently the scene of racial 
strife in connection with the integration of housing? 
a. Chicago 
c. Newark 
e. Cleveland 
b. Brooklyn 
d. Washington, D. C. 
*80. With which of the following did the U.S. recently sign an 
anti-hijacking pact? 
a. u.s.s.R. 
c. Red China 
e. Algeria 
b. Egypt 
d. Cuba 
*81. What country was the scene of the recent murders of two U. s. 
ambassadors? 
a. Sudan 
c. Libya 
e. Egypt 
b. Saudi Arabia 
d. Jordan 
82. Which of the following towns was recently taken over by members 
of the American Indian Movement (AIM)? 
a. Custer 
c. Commanche 
e. Sioux Falls 
b. Little Big Horn 
d. Wounded Knee 
83. Who of the following recently came out in favor of legalizing 
marijuana? 
a. George McGovern 
c. Benjamin Spock 
e. James Buckley 
b. William Buckley 
d. Robert Dole 
84. How many of those convicted in the Watergate case actually went 
to trial (didn't plead guilty)? 
a. 1 b. 2 c. 3 d. 4 e. 5 
85. Who is the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee? 
a. Larry O'Brien 
c. Robert Strause 
e. Richard Daley 
b. George McGovern 
d. Jean Westwood 
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86. Who of the following is not a Senator? 
a. Sam Erwin b. Gerald Ford 
c. Hubert Humphrey d. Edward Muskie 
e. Hugh Scott 
*87. Which of the following is not true for Richard Nixon? 
a. he ran for President in 1960 
b. he was Vice-President to Eisenhower 
c. he lost the election for governor of California in 1962 
d. he is a lawyer 
e. he was a member of the Senate but not the House 
*88. Which of the following judges was recently convicted of taking a 
bribe in Illinois? 
89. 
a. Hoffman 
c. Warren 
e. Hanrahan 
Who is the head 
a. Melvin Laird 
of 
c. William Rogers 
e. John Ehrlichman 
the 
b. Black 
d. Kerner 
Environmental Protection Agency? 
b. William Ruckelshaus 
d. Earl Butz 
90. Which of the following companies was accused last year of trying 
to block the election of Chile's President Allende? 
a. General Electric 
c. American Fruit 
e. Standard Oil 
b. Dow Chemical 
d. ITT 
*91. Which of the following changed his party affiliation from 
Republican to Democrat last year? 
a. Eagleton 
c. Lindsay 
e. Connally 
b. Wallace 
d. Thurmond 
~~92. Who of the following is the black congressman censured by a vote 
of Congress in 1967? 
a. 
c. 
e. 
93. Who 
for 
a. 
C, 
e. 
Powell 
Cleaver 
Dodd 
was the Roman 
conspiring to 
Cook 
0 'Sullivan 
Jackson 
b. King 
d. Gallagher 
Catholic priest indited with six others in 1972 
bomb draft boards? 
b. Ellsberg 
d. Berrigan 
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*94. Who of the following was convicted for shooting George Wallace? 
a. Ray 
c. Jackson 
e. Bremer 
b. Sirhan 
d. Ruby 
*95. When were the SALT accords signed between the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R.? 
a. 1969 b. 1970 c. 1971 d. 1972 e. 1973 
*96. Which of the following was the company commander at My Lai? 
a. Medina b. Eckhardt 
c O Abrams d. Caley 
e. Henderson 
•k97. What is the job of the IMF? 
a. enforcement of the wage-price controls 
b. regulation of international tariffs 
c. regulate international currencies 
d. regulation of bank interest rates 
e. regulation of stock exchange practices 
*98. What is the name of the new nation created after the India-
Pakistani War? 
a. Kashmir 
c. Biafra 
e. Bengall 
b. Bangladesh 
d. Napel 
99. With which of the following countries does the U.S. have 
diplomatic relations? 
a. Red China 
c. North Vietnam 
e. Egypt 
*100. What is the job of NATO? 
b. Chile 
d. Cuba 
a. provide economic aid to Europe 
b. defense of South East Asia 
c. control of trade 
d. defense of Western Europe 
e. regulate the Common Market 
*101. How many devaluations of the dollar have there been during 
Nixon 1 s administration? 
a. 1 b. 2 c. 3 d. 4 e. 5 
102. Which of the following is a reason for the dollar's loss of 
value? 
a. too few imports 
b. too many dollars in the U.S. 
c. too much foreign currency in the U.S. 
d. not enough U.S. production 
e. too many dollars in foreign countries 
103. Which of the following was not convicted in the Watergate 
case? 
a. McCord 
c. Liddy 
e. Gonzalez 
*Items selected for final scale. 
b. Segretti 
d. Hunt 
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